Research on the Dynamics Game Model in a Green Supply Chain: Government Subsidy Strategies under the Retailer’s Selling Effort Level

Yuan, Xigang; Xiao-qing, Zhang; Zhang, Dalin

doi:10.1155/2020/3083761

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 31 publications

(36 reference statements)

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“…Since many infrastructures are constructed and maintained by governmental agencies, when disaster relief supply chains are investigated, conversations center on governmental roles and responsibilities (Dayhim et al 2014;Rampersad et al 2020;Yuan et al 2020). Governments, however, face limitations and challenges in coping with disasters.…”

Section: Governmental Limitations and DI Culties In Disaster Relief S...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Challenges to maintaining disaster relief supply chains in island communities: disaster preparedness and response in Honolulu, Hawai’i

et al. 2022

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Due to global warming and rising sea levels, Honolulu, Hawai'i-a city on a remote island in the Paci c Ocean-is becoming more vulnerable to climate disasters. This article utilizes a mixed-method approach to investigate the challenges of maintaining disaster relief supply chains in the face of the emerging risks to Honolulu. We conduct eighteen in-depth interviews with key emergency management stakeholders to understand current approaches to supply chain risk management. Based on the research, three main challenges in uence disaster preparedness in Hawai'i. First, the physical location of the island and the spatial distribution of risk, assets, and capabilities supporting emergency relief present large, unusual constraints not found in other jurisdictions. Second, the challenges of supply chain management, planning, communications and coordination are exacerbated during disruptions and disaster events. Unlike other states, with neighboring, contiguous jurisdictions, there are severe limitations to mutual aid and assistance from outside sources. Third, our research has also identi ed cultural challenges associated with social, political, and economic development and change. Stronger institutional collaboration both within the state and beyond its boundaries are key to increased supply chain resilience and effective response and recovery from disasters. We conduct social network analysis focusing on measures of density, degree, betweenness, and centrality to better understand the status and gaps in institutional collaboration. The social network analysis reveals that the current levels of collaboration are relatively low with signi cant gaps between government agencies and the private sector, as well as limited vertical collaborations with respect to supply chain management between federal, state and local partners. There is a need for stronger leadership with deeper engagement across stakeholders. A pathway forward includes: 1) vulnerability analyses focused on private sector supply chain management and public sector transport hubs, networks, and facilities, 2) exercises and training on emergency supply chain management, and 3) longer-term actions to support sustainability, self-su ciency, local production, and community resilience. Our research is relevant not just to Hawai`i and other island and isolated communities but also to communities threatened by supply chain disruptions.

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Section: Governmental Limitations and DI Culties In Disaster Relief S...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Challenges to maintaining disaster relief supply chains in island communities: disaster preparedness and response in Honolulu, Hawai’i

et al. 2022

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“…Zhang et al investigate green supply chain decision-making under different government policies [26]. Yuan et al examine different government subsidy strategies in green supply chain management based on dynamic game theory and the principal-agent theory [27]. Shahzad et al identify the influence of organizational compatibilities on green supply chain management (GSCM) efforts and estimate their influence on organizational performance [28].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(iii) From equation (27), it can be seen that the green cost share of the manufacturer is a decreasing function of the supplier's green cost coefficient. at is, with the increase in the supplier's green cost coefficient, the cost and risk of the manufacturer's green cost will be increased, and the enthusiasm of the manufacturer for an investment will be reduced.…”

Section: Proofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental Investment Decision of Green Supply Chain considering the Green Uncertainty

Shao-bo

Yao

2020

Complexity

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The uncertainty of eco-friendly intermediate components has an important impact on green supply chain decisions. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model of green investment decision-making among enterprises is established by considering the case of the supplier’s green investment alone and the case of the manufacturer and the supplier’s joint green investment. The influence of green uncertainty on enterprise’s decision-making is analyzed, and the green investment decision-making strategies of both sides in two cases are compared. There are four main conclusions derived from the results: (i) with the increase in the supplier’s green cost coefficient, the supplier will reduce the green investment and the manufacturer will reduce the share of the green costs; (ii) with a decrease in uncertainty for eco-friendly intermediate components and the increase in their feasibility factor, the supplier will increase the greenness of intermediate components and increase the investment in environment, and the manufacturer will reduce the share of the green costs; (iii) the increase in the manufacturer’s share of green costs will promote the supplier to increase the greenness of intermediate components and increase its green investment, which shall increase the supplier’s optional choice space of for green investment; (iv) in the case of the manufacturer and the supplier jointly making a green investment, the threshold value for the environmental input of the supply chain members (i.e., the manufacturer and the supplier) is lower, and the supply chain members will have more choice space. At the same time, the care for environment in the case of a cooperative is higher than that in the case of a supplier investing alone.

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“…To improve the efficiency in resources utilization and reduce the effect of producing on environment, numerous countries focus on establishing a green supply chain (GSC). Some countries not only strengthen the legislation and the supervision on the environmental protection, but also provide subsides to green enterprises [8][9][10][11][12]. In fact, GSC has received adequate attention from scientific circles with the exception of political cycles.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence

Feng

Tan

et al. 2021

Mathematics

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This paper investigates a two-echelon green supply chain (GSC) with a single loss-averse manufacturer and a single loss-averse retailer. Since the Nash bargaining solution exactly characterizes endogenous power and the contribution of the GSC members, it is introduced as the loss-averse reference point for the GSC members. Based on this, a decision model of the two-echelon GSC with loss aversion is formulated. The optimal strategies of price and product green degree are derived in four scenarios: (a) the centralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the CD scenario; (b) the decentralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the DD scenario; (c) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the manufacturer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆m ≥ πm) scenario; (d) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the retailer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆r ≥ πr) scenario. Then, a comparative analysis of the optimal strategies and profits in these four scenarios is conducted, and the impacts of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient of products (GECP) on the GSC are also performed. The results show that (i) GECP has a critical influence on the retail price and the wholesale price; (ii) the GSC with loss aversion provide green products with the lowest green degree; (iii) the retail price, the wholesale price and product green degree are decreasing monotonically with the loss aversion level of the GSC member without incurring loss; (iv) furthermore, the effect of the loss aversion level of the GSC member with incurring loss on the optimal strategies is related to GECP and the gap between the GSC members’ loss aversion levels.

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Research on the Dynamics Game Model in a Green Supply Chain: Government Subsidy Strategies under the Retailer’s Selling Effort Level

Cited by 12 publications

References 31 publications

Challenges to maintaining disaster relief supply chains in island communities: disaster preparedness and response in Honolulu, Hawai’i

Challenges to maintaining disaster relief supply chains in island communities: disaster preparedness and response in Honolulu, Hawai’i

Environmental Investment Decision of Green Supply Chain considering the Green Uncertainty

Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence

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