Preventing State Crimes Against Democracy

Abstract

This article analyzes U.S. vulnerabilities to state crimes against democracy (SCADs). SCADs are actions or inactions by government insiders intended to manipulate democratic processes and undermine popular sovereignty. Watergate and Iran-Contra are well-known examples of SCADs involving top officials. SCADs in high office are difficult to detect and successfully prosecute because they are usually complex and compartmentalized; investigations are often compromised by conflicts of interests; and powerful norms discourage speculation about corruption in high office. However, liberal democracies can reduce their vulnerability to state political criminality by identifying vulnerabilities proactively and instituting policies for SCAD detection and prevention.

Conspiracy Theory Reconsidered

“…A better approach may be to avoid trying to find an acceptable name and definition for illegitimate or criminal forms of political intrigue , and instead develop criteria and procedures for identifying specific events that are so shocking, important, or sensitive that the public interest requires their investigation to be shifted from governments of regular jurisdiction to a separate agency established specifically for taking independent control of crime scenes, and ensuring that the events in question are thoroughly and credibly investigated, that findings are made public to the extent allowable by national security laws, and that recommendations for further action go directly to prosecutorial authorities (compare deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2009). The agency responsible for national systematic investigations (NSIs) would need a governance framework addressing at least four considerations: Triggers , that is, criteria and procedures for designating events requiring NSIs (NSI Events); Administrative Overrides , that is, policies governing the jurisdiction of the NSI agency and procedures for resolving any jurisdictional issues that may arise between, for example, the NSI agency and the CIA, FBI, Secret Service, White House staff, and so on; Investigative Scope and Methods , that is, investigative techniques, security protections, and study components required or authorized for NSIs; and Reporting Requirements , that is, the range of reports to be compiled and the types of or limits on the range of recommendations to be made and to which agencies.…”

Pretending Not to See or Hear, Refusing to Signify: The Farce and Tragedy of Geocentric Public Affairs Scholarship

“…Freund 2004;Hirsch, 2004;Johnson, 2004). Fast forward: No author of the PSQ symposium challenges the many official ellipses of evidence surrounding 9/11; rather, these authors strive only to situate politics ex post facto 9/11 within a pattern of lying, not to interrogate the copious material evidence making plausible (and therefore warranting judicious attention) that the 9/11 event itself might have precipitated an epochal lie of massive symbolic relevance (Ahmed, 2005;deHaven-Smith, 2006deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2009;Griffin, 2004Griffin, , 2007Griffin & Scott, 2007;Jones, 2008;Marrs, 2006).…”

Exit, Voice, Loyalty Revisited

“…The increasing frequency, scale, and sophistication of SCADs have been traced to the expansion of government secrecy during and after the cold war (deHaven-Smith 2010), America's increasing reliance on and capabilities for covert paramilitary operations (ibid. 2010;deHaven-Smith and Witt 2009), intensified partisanship and its debilitating effects on institutional checks and balances (deHaven-Smith 2006), the superficial, propagandistic character of corporatized mass media (Witt and deHaven-Smith 2008), powerful norms against voicing suspicions of antidemocratic conspiracies in high office (deHaven-Smith 2006Manwell 2010), and the rise of political-economic complexes in armaments production, intelligence gathering, finance, energy, and other areas (deHaven-Smith 2010;deHaven-Smith et al 2010).…”