Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy

Abstract

This book addresses the following question: why are presidential democracies more likely to break down than parliamentary ones? Conventional wisdom among political scientists pointS to the incentives generated by the form of government itself; the independence of the executive and legislature that defines presidentialism generates incentives that are not conducive to the consolidation of democracy. On the basis of a data set that covers all democracies between 1946 and 2002, this book demonstrates that this is not the case: the incentives generated by presidentialism are as conducive to the consolidation of democracy as the ones generated by parliamentarism. The book argues that what kills presidentialism is the fact that it exists in countries where democracies of any type are not likely to survive. This book will be of interest to academic researchers, graduates and advanced undergraduates enrolled in courses on comparative politics and political economy.

Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism: patterns of majority formation in 29 democracies

“…However, since these systems also separate the origin of the executive from the legislature, they have the important downside of concentrating executive power in a single individual (Linz 1994). This leads to severe dilemmas in institutional design, most notably with respect to term limits for the president (Carey 2003;Cheibub 2007). It also tends to undermine the unity and programmatic capacities of political parties (Carey 2009;Passarelli 2015;Samuels and Shugart 2010).…”

Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing

“…Although there are differences regarding the conditions of the governmental structure, the decision-making process in presidential and parliamentary systems of government may share similar characteristics (CHEIBUB, 2007;CHEIBUB, ELKINS and GINSBURG, 2014;TSEBELIS, 1995), and; ii. Potential analytical gains can be achieved when analyses overlook the differences between regimes, and consider instead intra-government scheme variations (EATON, 2000).…”

“…It may also vary according to other political factors, such as whether a minister's party is the pivotal actor in maintaining the coalition in the legislature (FORTUNATO and STEVENSON, 2013). Furthermore, the T Victor Araújo, Thiago Silva & Marcelo Vieira (2016) 10 (2) e0007 -3/23 distribution of resources for policy-making in the cabinet is directly related to the degree of influence the parties can exert on the composition of the executive agenda (ARAÚJO, 2016). Thus, the variation of how powerful the president is, vis-à-vis the cabinet, is of fundamental importance to enhancing our understanding of presidents' powers over their cabinets.…”

A sustentável leveza da democracia? Os efeitos da qualidade democrática sobre o desempenho ambiental

“…De acordo com Gerring (2001), para que x seja considerado causa de y, não pode ser contingente de z. Uma das formas para atenuar esse risco é adicionar variáveis de controle ao modelo. De acordo com a literatura, quando o assunto é o efeito de regimes democráticos sobre outros fenômenos é preciso controlar ao menos cinco variáveis: 1) riqueza; 2) crescimento econômico; 3) desigualdade; 4) sistema de governo e 5) região do planeta (Alvarez et al, 1996;Przeworski et al, 1997;Cheibub, 2007 A interpretação derivada apontou que, realmente, a poluição acompanha, inicialmente, o crescimento da produção nacional, configurando um "efeito renda", entretanto, ao se atingir determinado nível de renda, a qualidade ambiental começa a crescer de forma paralela ao PIB per capita (Agras & Chapman, 1999).…”

“…Segundo Cheibub (2007), grande parte da Ciência Política Comparada acredita na superioridade do parlamentarismo. Nesse caso: a relação entre democracia e desempenho ambiental não deve se manter em países governados por sistemas presidencialistas (4ª condição).…”