President Clinton and the Republican Congress, 1995-2000: Political and Policy Dimensions of Veto Politics in Divided Government

Conley, Richard S.

doi:10.1080/07343460409507702

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Conley (2004), for example, argues that, in Clinton's presidency, the "blame game" politics of the 104th 282 M. G. JARVIS Congress gave way to "coordination" politics in Clinton's second term. Conley's (2003) study of George H.W. Bush's veto threats notes the utility of public versus private veto threats.…”

Section: Existing Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 96%

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Eisenhower's Veto Threats: Full of Nothing, Signifying Sound and Fury

Jarvis

2010

Congress & the Presidency

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The veto is one of the few formal powers accorded to the president of the United States, yet it plays a central role in many theories of the executive branch and in theories of congressional action as well. To be more precise, the threat of a future veto is generally held to be the important component. However, there have been few empirical or theoretical studies of veto threats. This article presents new systematic data on the veto "threats" of President Dwight Eisenhower. These data are analyzed to test novel theories regarding the relation of future veto threats to the outcomes of past veto threats. Specifically, this theory extends concepts of credibility of threat to include information that is specific to both the president in question and that president's then-current history of congressional interactions. Support is found for the theory that a president who "cries wolf" and fails to carry out threats will find Congress less responsive to future threats, unless and until the president's credibility is reestablished.If the decision is close, I want to veto.-Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1935 1 We hear the veto threats, but they just don't mean anything anymore. You can only take so many threats seriously before you just tune them out. -Anonymous Democratic congressional aide, 2002 (Curl 2002, A01) We'd like him [Bush] to veto something-anything-to show he's in charge. -Anonymous Republican congressional aide, 2002 (Curl 2002, A01)Veto threats are curious beasts. A successful veto threat is one that is never carried out. 2 This makes the study of threats difficult because the study of veto threats is the study of events that should never occur. Moreover, an unchallenged veto threat could also be an unobserved veto threat. Yet, the veto is at the heart of many formal theories of both the presidency and of inter-institutional relationships, and

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Section: Existing Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Cameron (2000) samples legislation to investigate using media resources. Others rely on presidential libraries to uncover veto threats (Conley 2003(Conley , 2004Deen & Arnold 2002a. However, as Spitzer notes, "much effort is expended by both Congress and the media to discern the president's opinion on important legislation .…”

Section: Data Sourcesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Eisenhower's Veto Threats: Full of Nothing, Signifying Sound and Fury

Jarvis

2010

Congress & the Presidency

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“…Various scholars have looked at different constitutional powers that give the president significant leverage. For instance, the veto not only allows presidents to block laws that they find objectionable, but they can also employ the threat of a veto to help shape the wording and nature of a bill into something closer to their personal preferences (Conley 2003a(Conley , 2004Conley and Yon 2007). Chief legislator, chief diplomat, commander-in-chief-these are all roles that stem directly from constitutional provisions (respectively: making legislative recommendations, negotiating treaties and receiving ambassadors, and commanding the military).…”

Section: Intercurrence Institutional Change and The Unilateral Presmentioning

confidence: 99%

Donald Trump and Institutional Change Strategies

Cash

Bridge

2018

Laws

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This article integrates three fields of study: the "regime politics" paradigm in law and courts, the "institutional change" approach in public policy, and the "unilateral presidency" literature. In doing so, we show how law, politics, and public policy are inextricably linked, and that researchers can borrow assumptions, methods, and theories from a variety of fields. We use Donald Trump's early presidency to show how political actors (especially presidents) can use four different change strategies. In the case of Trump, we highlight: shifting of decision-making authority via insurrectionary displacement; the elimination of the individual mandate via subversive layering; a change in drone use policy via opportunistic conversion; and a gradual desensitization and change in school choice education policy via symbiotic drift. We conclude by offering lessons for all three literatures we incorporate, as well as a way forward for studying a presidential administration that many find difficult to analyze.

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“…Not surprisingly, strategies designed to win over public relations figure prominently in the president's interaction with Congress. In fact, Conley's work shows how President Clinton's rhetorical strategies, as well as missteps by the GOP leadership, were critical to winning the “blame game” over the government shutdown and achieving eventual policy concessions from the GOP during the deeply divided 104th Congress (). President Clinton's rhetorical campaign degraded the opposition party's agenda, revived his own standing with the public, and greatly strengthened his strategic position relative to the GOP leadership over future budget negotiations (Conley , 149).…”

Section: Political Conditions and Expectations For Rhetorical Signingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Congress engages the president regularly in interinstitutional rhetorical wars. However, even powerful congressional leaders usually find themselves at a relative disadvantage with respect to the White House (Conley ; Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht ). And the Court, short of individual justices writing their own press releases, is ill equipped, even if so inclined, to shape the media or compete in the rhetorical arena with the presidency (Davis ).…”

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confidence: 99%

Assessing the Rhetorical Side of Presidential Signing Statements

2013

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Recent work on the constitutional signing statement suggests such tools can be designed to defend constitutional and institutional powers or help presidents shape policy. Much less is known about rhetorical signing statements and their significance for presidential power. Our analysis from 1981-2008 demonstrates that rhetorical signing statements are calculated messages that vary in purpose from heaping praise on Congress to credit claiming and building political capital. The findings highlight the role of political conditions like divided government and presidential approval levels as well as salience of legislative opportunities in explaining the type of rhetorical message aimed at Congress.

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President Clinton and the Republican Congress, 1995-2000: Political and Policy Dimensions of Veto Politics in Divided Government

Cited by 9 publications

References 11 publications

Eisenhower's Veto Threats: Full of Nothing, Signifying Sound and Fury

Eisenhower's Veto Threats: Full of Nothing, Signifying Sound and Fury

Donald Trump and Institutional Change Strategies

Assessing the Rhetorical Side of Presidential Signing Statements

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