Signing statements have become an important device that both protects and enhances presidential power by signaling how legislation is to be implemented, offering a mechanism of electoral reward, and protecting presidential prerogatives. We offer a first cut at explaining signing statements by applying William Howell's theory of unilateral action. The evidence shows that presidents use signing statements under conditions of gridlock, such as divided government, which erode their influence in Congress. The findings also suggest a strategic element to signing statement behavior. Presidents issue significantly more signing statements on major legislation when the policy and political stakes are greatest. The results provide insight into the theory of unilateral action and demonstrate how signing statements complement rather than contradict the Richard Neustadt view of power.

Recent research on congressional-executive relations has concluded that partisan and ideological forces explaining decision making in domestic policy have also become dominant in the realm of foreign policy. Accordingly, scholars have inferred the effective demise of the two-presidencies. In this analysis, the authors compare models explaining bipartisan congressional support of the president on domestic issues with that of foreign and defense. Although factors relating to the congressional context tended to be influential in both policy areas, they found important differences in the effects of factors relating to the international context. They also found that congressional bipartisan support was significantly less likely on matters related to the purse strings and on issues such as trade. The contrasting effects of the explanatory factors across policy areas suggest the importance of both the two-presidencies and resurgent Congress perspectives in explaining congressional-executive interactions.With the end of the cold war, it seems unlikely that a broad domestic consensus will arise concerning the role of the United States in the newly emerging international order. Charles Kegley (1993), for instance, believed that the end of the cold war has changed "all the answers and all the questions" (p. 141), and cold war icon Paul Nitze (1999) saw a new international system that offers "less direct traditional security threats to the United States" (p. 3).660 Presidential Studies Quarterly 31, no. 4 (December)

Until recently, the signing statement-a written statement the president can append to a bill after he signs it into law-remained buried in the footnotes of history. However, for modern presidents, the signing statement has become one important, albeit understudied, example of "presidential unilateralism"-strategies employed to preserve executive prerogatives and advance presidential policy in the face of gridlock. This article examines how presidents exert influence through signing statements and their role in the context of the separation of powers. Copyright (c) 2010 by the Southwestern Social Science Association.

Previous research suggests that women’s descriptive representation may have a role-model effect on young women, encouraging them to greater levels of political participation. Using data from the Monitoring the Future Survey and the National Survey of Political and Civic Engagement of Young People, we examine whether highly visible female role models like Hillary Clinton, Nancy Pelosi, and Sarah Palin, and viable female candidates for governor and senator had a role-model effect on young women. At the national level, we find some evidence of a role-model effect resulting from the election of Speaker Pelosi and the presidential candidacy of Hillary Clinton, but the effects are largely concentrated among young women who are Democratic and liberal. We find little evidence that Sarah Palin’s vice-presidential run had a role-model effect on young women, regardless of party or ideology. Our state-level analysis of viable female gubernatorial and senatorial candidates finds that role-model effects on young women and men are mediated in different ways by ideology and, to a lesser extent, party.

This article investigates the variables that affect the award of tenure in political science departments in the United States. We examined two dependent variables:(1) whether a department has denied tenure in the past five years, and (2) whether a positive departmental tenure recommendation has been reversed by higher college or university authorities during the same period of time. Five clusters of independent variables were evaluated: (1) college/university and departmental characteristics, (2) the procedures employed to evaluate tenure cases, (3) the instruments used to assess teaching, (4) service expectations, and (5) research and publication standards. We found that the most important factors affecting departmental decisions to deny tenure were whether teaching and substantive publications were treated as equally valuable qualifications, the number of articles a candidate published, and the candidate's level of commitment to advising. Interestingly, reversal decisions by higher authorities were not strongly affected by any of the variables in the analysis.