Preferences, perceptions, and veto players: explaining devolution negotiation outcomes in the Canadian territorial north

Abstract

ABSTRACT. Since the early part of the 20th century, the federal government has engaged in a long and slow process of devolution in the Canadian Arctic. Although the range of powers devolved to the territorial governments has been substantial over the years, the federal government still maintains control over the single most important jurisdiction in the region, territorial lands and resources, which it controls in two of the three territories, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. This fact is significant for territorial governments because gaining jurisdiction over their lands and resources is seen as necessary for dramatically improving the lives of residents and governments in the Canadian north. Relying on archival materials, secondary sources, and 33 elite interviews, this paper uses a rational choice framework to explain why the Yukon territorial government was able to complete a final devolution agreement relating to lands and resources in 2001 and why the governments of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut have not. It finds that the nature and distance of federal-territorial preferences, combined with government perceptions of aboriginal consent and federal perceptions of territorial capacity and maturity, explain the divergent outcomes experienced by the three territorial governments in the Canadian arctic.The following acronyms are employed:

The Dynamics of Intra-jurisdictional Relations in the Inuit Regions of the Canadian Arctic: An Institutionalist Perspective

“…We focus on preferences and power because the intergovernmental relations and negotiation literatures emphasize these factors as being important and influential for structuring interactions and outcomes (Simeon, 2006). For instance, comprehensive land-claims and devolution negotiations in the Canadian territorial north have been found to be strongly influenced by the distance between the preferences of the negotiating actors (Alcantara, 2012(Alcantara, , 2013). …”

“…10 The Canadian territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut) were established by federal legislation and, as a result, their powers are somewhat constrained by federal paramountcy. In recent years, however, they have gained greater autonomy through a process of devolution (see Alcantara, 2013).…”

“…Both organizations support devolution in principle, but their preferences diverge on the specifics, especially in controversial areas, such as resource development. Generally speaking, the GN seeks 'province-type' powers to manage the territory's resources, while NTI wants to ensure that devolution does not derogate from any party's responsibilities under the NLCA (Mayer, 2007;Alcantara, 2013). If devolution occurs in the future, it could trigger conflict between the GN, which seeks greater control over Nunavut's resources, and NTI, which has primary and existing responsibility for resources under the NLCA.…”

Assessing Devolution in the Canadian North: A Case Study of the Yukon Territory

“…Efficiency gains are also realized because sub-national governments can carry out these functions more quickly than a higher level of government can. For instance, research suggests that federal involvement in on-reserve land management in Canada tends to be much less efficient in terms of transaction times because of the geographic distance between the decision makers and the local community (Alcantara, 2005).…”

“…Scholars in the humanities and social sciences have also spent significant time in the area, examining the variety of indigenous land claims and innovative self-government initiatives that have emerged there (Henderson, 2007;White, 2008;Alcantara and Whitfield, 2010). Finally, researchers have long been interested in the political and constitutional maturation of the Canadian North, with a particular focus on how devolution has transformed the territories into quasi-provinces with significant powers and resources (Cameron and Campbell, 2009;Dacks, 1990;McArthur, 2009;White, 2009;Alcantara, 2012).…”