Power-Sharing Challenges: From Weak Adoptability to Dysfunction in Iraq

Abstract

A potentially beneficial conflict management tool, post-conflict power-sharing is often marred by political crises and instability. We explore the link between power-sharing 'adoptability' and functionality. Focusing on Iraq, we demonstrate that weak adoptability (when one of more groups have grave reservations about the settlement) harms power-sharing in several important ways. First, weak adoptability by the Sunni community led to their exclusion and mobilisation against the state. Second, weak adoptability provided political space for Shiites to dominate in politics, undermining the very basis of post-conflict power-sharing. Third, weak adoptability further compounded constitutional contestation, leading to the Kurdish independence referendum in 2017.

From Dayton to Bernese Jura: The Election of the Croat Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

“…The divergent preferences between Bosniak and Croat elites over the type of electoral system can be reflected in the adoptability of the geometric mean. The adoptability of a power‐sharing system depends on “the extent to which the groups support the establishment of a power‐sharing polity” (McEvoy & Aboultaif, 2020: 2), and whether they are more supportive of a consociational or centripetal system (McGarry, 2017: 513). Horowitz (2014: 8–9) writes that the adoption question depends on negotiators, preferences of majorities and minorities, and “bargaining problems.” McGarry (2017: 513) introduces a set of “motivational elements” that might incentivize adoption of a power‐sharing system, i.e., “external pressures, demographic change, economic opportunities, or hurting stalemates.” McEvoy and Aboultaif (2020: 17) argue that the adoptability process should respect groups' vital interests and consider groups' views on the settlement “as an existential threat to their survival.” McGarry's (2017) “motivational elements” and McEvoy and Aboultaif's (2020) “groups' interests” necessity can also be considered as a framework for addressing the adoptability of the geometric mean for the election of the Croat member of the Presidency.…”

“…McEvoy and Aboultaif (2020) show that “groups' interests” play a pivotal role in the adoptability problem. Considering existing political positions and interests in BiH (McCrudden & O'Leary, 2013a; Basta, 2016), Croat political leadership regularly voices that it is “unacceptable” that one people select representatives in the name of the other people, in particular after the election of Komšić (Keil & Perry, 2015).…”

Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities in Algeria, Iraq, and Turkey, 1990–2019

“…Increasing geographical disparities deepened the ethnic cleavage that took the form of an independence referendum for the Kurdistan Region in 2017, whose legality was rejected by the federal government. United as opponents to Saddam's regime, the alliance between Kurdish and Shia has been increasingly questioned with the war against ISIS (McEvoy and Aboultaif, 2020).…”

Iraq’s Informal Consociationalism and Its Problems

“…The second dynamic within Iraqi politics that places doubt on Lijphart’s approach and consociational power‐sharing more generally surrounds the issue of dominant identities. Although Lijphart disavowed an earlier commitment to primordialism, consociational scholars have little to say about where identities come from, how sub‐state communities are solidified and can change, or the validity of the national elite’s claims to represent their constituencies (Anderson 2015; McEvoy and Aboultaif 2020). Inflexible ‘segmental cleavages’ remained central to Lijphart’s work (Lijphart 1977:48).…”

“…Matthijs Bogaards, by contrast, traces Iraq’s current political problems back to what he terms the constitution’s ‘light’ consociationalism, focused on temporary power‐sharing measures and ‘fluid federalism’ (Bogaards 2019b:2). Still others emphasize the exclusionary, secretive and rushed manner in which the document was written and the flaws this has created (Aboultaif 2020; Anderson 2015; Arato 2009; Hay 2014; Horowitz 2008; McEvoy and Morrow 2005). These criticisms are all well founded.…”