Iraq’s Informal Consociationalism and Its Problems

This paper argues that consociational power-sharing in the Arab world is intrinsically counter-revolutionary. The academic debate on consociational power-sharing has largely overlooked this because 1) it presupposes class inequalities and overemphasizes state stability; and 2) it is limited by a broader misunderstanding of counter-revolution, in which the concept is reduced to momentary reactions to revolution. By critiquing class and state assumptions in the consociational power-sharing literature and presenting a nuanced conceptualization of counter-revolution, this paper seeks to bring the debate closer to the concurrent revolutionary episodes against the consociational arrangements of Lebanon and Iraq, and to inspire more inclusionary state-(re)building arrangements in the Arab world. * Ibrahim Halawi is a Teaching Fellow in International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London. His research focuses on theorizing the concept of counter-revolution and examining its manifestation in the contemporary Middle East. His doctoral thesis lays out a history of counter-revolution and revolution in Egypt not as separable, televised events, but as processes that are continuous, evolving, and interrelated. During the pursuit of his PhD, Ibrahim worked as an Opinion Editor for The New Arab and published several op-eds and book reviews with E-IR, OpenDemocracy, and Middle East Eye, among others. Prior to that, he co-founded a pluralistic student movement in Beirut. He also founded a student-led non-sectarian newspaper aimed at de-hegemonizing sectarian news.

Section: The Counter‐revolution Will Not Be Televisedmentioning

confidence: 98%

Consociational Power‐Sharing in the Arab World as Counter‐Revolution

Halawi

2020

“…The pace of the process also matters. In Iraq, as Toby Dodge (2020) argues in this special feature, the rushed nature of the constitutional design process, given America’s determination to keep to a tight deadline, meant that insufficient time was available to convince opponents that the settlement could accommodate their interests. These early problems spilled over into the agreement’s implementation.…”

Section: Getting To Yesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Power‐Sharing Performance: A Lifecycle Approach

McCulloch

McEvoy

2020

Power-sharing is a leading institutional strategy for the management of ethnic conflict. Yet its performance is uneven. It often delivers a peace dividend: stopping violence, avoiding minority exclusion, and reducing group-based insecurity. Its decision-making efficiency and governance record, however, have weaker evaluations. We conceptualize 'the power-sharing lifecycle' to better understand the reasons for this uneven record. Exploring power-sharing performance through a lifecycle lens helps illuminate the experiences ofand potential forpower-sharing in the post-uprisings Arab world and beyond. The Power-Sharing Lifecycle Power-sharing is a leading institutional strategy for the management of ethnic conflict. Yet its performance is uneven. It often delivers a peace dividend: stopping violence, avoiding minority exclusion, and reducing group-based insecurity. Its decision-making efficiency and governance record, however, have weaker evaluations. Power-sharing thus works in some places on some issues at some times but it does not work everywhere all of the time (McGarry 2020). We conceptualize 'the power-sharing lifecycle' to better understand the reasons for this uneven record. Exploring power-sharing performance through a lifecycle lens helps illuminate the experiences ofand potential forpower-sharing in the post-uprisings Arab world and beyond.

“…While consociationalism was once understood by institutional designers to be transformative, facilitating a transition to a less sectarian system, the reverse is true. Toby Dodge’s (2020) contribution to this special feature underscores how consociational power‐sharing arrangements are frequently hammered out under duress, often when communal violence is pervasive and there is a greater need for stability than performance. Rather than transformation and change, consociations tend to develop ossified properties rendering them resistant to practically any reform.…”

Section: Power‐sharing Zombifiedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consociationalism is Dead! Long Live Zombie Power‐Sharing!

Nagle

2020

Scholars argue that consociationalism has become the preferred institutional tool of choice for the international community when seeking an end to civil war. This paper argues that consociationalism is increasingly becoming redundant as an institutional apparatus to end violent conflict linked to intra-state conflict. Over the last few decades divided societies have been subjected to consociational influence. In many places consociational institutions have long since ceased functioning in a way that is healthy for the body politic, yet somehow consociationalism remains dominant both for policy prescription and in academic thinking. While consociationalism was once understood by institutional designers to be transformative, facilitating a transition to a less sectarian system, the reverse is true. Rather than transformation and change, consociations tend to develop ossified properties rendering them resistant to practically any reform. Summoning the image of the zombie, I note that consociationalism is 'dead but dominant' and has to defend itself through increasingly authoritarian statecraft. Consociationalism is thus neither dead nor alive, but walking dead, listlessly stumbling from one crisis to the next. Each crisis is experienced contingently with the feeling that something could happenthat something could changevery soon, even as routine prevails in the face of an increasingly defensive state.