Power distance orientation as an antecedent of individuals’ intentions to engage in radical political action

Abstract

The cultural dimension of power distance refers to individuals’ acceptance of power inequalities in society. Countries characterized by high power distance at the collective level face more domestic extremism. However, research has yet to examine how individual differences in power distance orientation may affect individuals’ intentions to engage in radical and violent political action. In this research, we test the hypothesis that stronger endorsement of power distance values makes people more prone to express their intentions to engage in radical and violent political action. To test the hypothesis’ generalizability across contexts, we sample from 2 countries characterized by different levels of power distance at the collective level, South Korea (higher power distance) and the United States (lower power distance). Studies 1a and 1b were surveys ( N = 1,214) demonstrating an association between power distance orientation and radical political action over and beyond other known predictors of political participation, including political efficacy, perceived justice, emotions of anger and contempt, political orientation, and social dominance orientation. In Studies 2a–2c ( N = 430; 2c preregistered), priming a higher (vs. lower) power distance orientation heightened individuals’ propensity to express the intentions to engage in radical political action. Theoretical implications of the findings, and future research directions, are discussed.

Compliance and Self-Reporting During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Cross-Cultural Study of Trust and Self-Conscious Emotions in the United States, Italy, and South Korea

“…Conversely, “vertical” cultures place importance on hierarchical relationships and differences in status, either in the context of competing individuals (vertical individualism, VI) or ranked groups (vertical collectivism, VC). This fourfold typology is an important predictor of a range of behaviors and attitudes ( Triandis and Gelfand, 1998 ; Shavitt et al, 2006,2011a,b ; Moon et al, 2018 ; Travaglino and Moon, 2020 ).…”

“If they don’t listen to us, they deserve it”: The effect of external efficacy and anger on the perceived legitimacy of hacking

“…This finding was in apparent contrast with some of the research conducted using the dual pathway model, in which instrumental (i.e., efficacy) and emotional (i.e., anger) considerations are described as independent paths to political engagement (van Zomeren et al, 2012). Research on the dual pathway model has generally examined how individuals perceive the group’s ability to achieve social change, rather than their sense of efficacy in relation to the responsiveness of the system (see also Tausch et al, 2011; Travaglino, 2017; Travaglino & Moon, in press). Moreover, this research has yet to assess the role of anger against the system (Travaglino & Moon, in press).…”

“…Research on the dual pathway model has generally examined how individuals perceive the group’s ability to achieve social change, rather than their sense of efficacy in relation to the responsiveness of the system (see also Tausch et al, 2011; Travaglino, 2017; Travaglino & Moon, in press). Moreover, this research has yet to assess the role of anger against the system (Travaglino & Moon, in press). Future research should consider the role of different forms of efficacy, in relation to different targets (e.g., the system, the group) in order to provide a better understanding of the relationships between efficacy, emotions and dissent.…”

Radicalization and violent extremism: Perspectives from research on group processes and intergroup relations

“…The most promising avenue, however, may lie in a focus on intentions to engage in radical or violent extremist behavior. With this approach, which four of the nine articles adopt (Adam-Troïan et al, 2020; Obaidi et al, 2020; Renström et al, 2020; Travaglino & Moon, 2020), it becomes possible to investigate directly the kinds of behavior that we are interested in, and that research on radicalization and violent extremism should help to explain and to prevent. At the same time, the substantial variation among participants on the measures used in the articles indicates that the measures remain meaningful for ordinary people under extraordinary circumstances.…”

“…Obaidi et al (2020) show, in four studies ( N = 425, 402, 127, 366), that religious identity creates a global perceived ingroup, and that perceived threats to and repression of parts of this group strengthen intentions to violently defend that group, even across geopolitical borders. Finally, Travaglino and Moon (2020) focus on the group defined in terms of shared cultural norms, and in four studies ( N = 601, 613, 120, and 151) show how stronger endorsement of power distance increases intentions to engage in radical and violent political action in the United States as well as in South Korea.…”