2014
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewu018
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Power, Composition, and Decision Making: The Behavioral Consequences of Institutional Reform on Brazil’sSupremo Tribunal Federal

Abstract: How does a court's policy-making authority shape the nature of judicial behavior? We argue that judicial systems that limit policy-making authority also discourage the politicization of courts, encouraging judges to think narrowly about the interests of litigating parties. In contrast, granting a court high policy-making authority-affecting potentially thousands of cases and other branches of government-naturally encourages judges to consider broader ideological principles. Typically, unraveling cause and effe… Show more

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Cited by 27 publications
(28 citation statements)
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References 36 publications
(23 reference statements)
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“…We also know that the presidential appointment influences coalitions configuration in the Supreme Court, and different compositions, formed from presidential nomination blocs, result in different decision patterns (see, as example, OLIVEIRA, 2012b;DESPOSATO, INGRAM andLANNES, 2015 andROSEVEAR, HARTMANN and.…”
Section: Now We Know Studying Large Volumes Of Cases Decided By Supremementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…We also know that the presidential appointment influences coalitions configuration in the Supreme Court, and different compositions, formed from presidential nomination blocs, result in different decision patterns (see, as example, OLIVEIRA, 2012b;DESPOSATO, INGRAM andLANNES, 2015 andROSEVEAR, HARTMANN and.…”
Section: Now We Know Studying Large Volumes Of Cases Decided By Supremementioning
confidence: 99%
“…With this behavior Justice Marco Aurélio gained the reputation of intentional dissident, "defeated vote", leading many researchers, even, to exclude him from his models of understanding of judicial behavior (see DESPOSATO et al, 2015).…”
Section: Frequency and Situations That Divided Stf Plenary On Adismentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Peluso, relator do processo, é o primeiro ministro nomeado ao STF pelo então presidente Lula, que tinha na Reforma do Judiciário Fabiana Luci de Oliveira, Diego H. S. Falavinha, Simone Braghin DOI: 10.12957/dep.2015.18739 | ISSN: 2179 uma de suas bandeiras de governo. Sabemos, a partir de outras pesquisas (Oliveira, 2012;Desposato et al, 2015), que a nomeação presidencial influencia a forma de posicionamento dos ministros, portanto não podemos deixar de considerar essa informação como relevante. O único a votar pela procedência total do pedido foi o Ministro Marco…”
Section: Processo Decisório E a Discussão Da Reforma Do Judiciário Nounclassified
“…Ou seja, a mudança de governo e de partidos que assumem o cargo da Presidência da República não provocaria uma alteração no comportamento dos ministros (Jaloretto e Mueller, 2011;Leoni e Ramos, 2006;Lopes, 2013) e não haveria polarização entre ministros indicados por partidos diferentes (Ferreira e Mueller, 2014). Trabalhos mais recentes se contrapõem à literatura dominante ao afirmarem que é possível encontrar evidências de que haveria um viés de comportamento dos ministros produzido pela indicação presidencial (Desposato, Ingram, e Lannes Jr., 2014;Oliveira, 2012a). As indicações feitas a partir do governo Lula teriam diminuído a proporção de magistrados com carreira judicial, além de selecionar nomes com ideologias mais próximas às do governo.…”
Section: Lista De Figurasunclassified