“…Second, family firms are controlled by owner-managers rather than professional managers who do not have significant ownership (Stewart & Hitt, 2012). This source of control can sometimes reduce agency problems between owners and managers (Pollak, 1985) and between owner-managers and lenders (Hillier, Martinez, Patel, Pindado, & Requejo, 2018) but at the price of sometimes creating agency problems among owners (Peng, Sun, Vlas, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2018; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) and between family owner-managers and family members who do not directly participate in the governance of the firm (Villalonga, Amit, & Guzman, 2015). 4 Third, sometimes the pursuit of solutions to these problems can generate unique double-agency costs through the creation of intermediary governance mechanisms (Zellweger & Kammerlander, 2015).…”