Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil

Abstract

The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 gave relatively strong powers to the President. We model and test Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil and demonstrate that Presidents have used pork as a political currency to exchange for votes on policy reforms. In particular Presidents Cardoso and Lula have used pork to exchange for amendments to the Constitution. Without policy reforms Brazil would have had greater difficulty meeting their debt obligations. The logic for the exchange of pork for policy reform is that Presidents typically have greater electoral incentives than members of Congress to care about economic growth, economic opportunity, income equality and price stabilization. Members of Congress generally care more about redistributing gains to their constituents. Given the differences in preferences and the relative powers of each, the Legislative and Executive benefit by exploiting the gains from trade.

(Sub)national Principals, Legislative Agents

“…Other research on policymaking in federal systems focuses on presidential influence over the behavior of national legislators (Alston & Mueller, 2005;Raile et al, 2011;Zucco, 2009). Presidents can build support among national legislators through appointments to the bureaucracy and the cabinet, and also by transferring pork to legislators for which they can claim credit.…”

“…Presidents may also promise future appointments to deputies in exchange for votes and support for presidential initiatives (Alston & Mueller, 2005;Benton, 2007;Raile et al, 2011;Zucco, 2009). Congressional leaders in particular are in a position to support the president's agenda in the Chamber of Deputies.…”

Pork is policy: Dissipative inclusion at the local level

“…An alternative perspective sees pork barrel politics in a lighter vein. Be it because voters demand this type of policy and it brings electoral rewards to incumbents who deliver pork (Ames, Pereira, & Rennó, ; Pereira & Rennó, ), or because the negotiation over the execution of amendments on the part of the executive branch is transformed into an important guarantee of governability (Alston & Mueller, ; Ames, ; Pereira & Mueller, ), amendments are essential to foster representation of interests and grease the decision‐making process in multiparty presidential systems (Raile, Pereira, & Power, ). In this last aspect, pork is exchanged for political support.…”

“…Hence, pork barrel policymaking requires intra‐ and interparty coordination as well as between branches of government. This process is extremely complex, making coordination and close scrutiny of all amendments by the small group of individuals responsible for their organization highly improbable (Alston & Mueller, ; Figueiredo & Limongi, ; Pereira & Mueller, ). Furthermore, the exclusion of budgetary amendments is costly for those in charge of coordinating this process, as it is prone to logrolling practices.…”

The Fiscal Imperative and the Role of Public Prosecutors in Brazilian Environmental Policy

“…The second category involves policies used by the president to provide patronage to other political actors in exchange for support in approving his/her agenda of reforms—that is, geographically concentrated transfers, or “pork.” Political institutions in Brazil provide the president with several political “currencies,” such as jobs in the federal structure and budgetary transfers that can be used to “purchase” support, especially within Congress, thus providing high levels of governability at low cost. Although there are undesirable aspects to this form of policymaking, there are also advantages of having effective means of realizing political transactions in a country with such dire need for reforms (Alston and Mueller 2006).…”