Pork is policy: Dissipative inclusion at the local level

Abstract

The article investigates the impact of local policies on human development indicators in Brazilian municipalities. This is an attempt to investigate the role of the legislative branch in reducing inequality and poverty through budget amendments, usually seen in derogatory form as pork barrel politics. We assess the effect of pork on municipalities using up‐to‐date policy evaluation techniques. Brazil is a case of extreme inequality and an active legislative branch in disbursing monies. The data set contains over 60,000 observations from all 5,500+ Brazilian municipalities for over a decade. We use matching and longitudinal data analysis techniques, treating pork as exogenous shocks, mapping how its effect reverberates on social and economic indicators in succeeding years. The results indicate a positive impact of such policies in improving local level development. However, these results are not sustainable over time, thus suggesting inclusion with a dissipative profile.

Legislature Size and Welfare: Evidence from Brazil

“…Second, to get reelected, besides providing the services that voters prefer, politicians have to take credit for facilitating provision (Weaver 1986;Fiorina et al 1987;Gulzar and Pasquale 2017;Nielsen and Moynihan 2017;Silva and Whitten 2017). Typically, the services that are easiest in terms of credit claiming are either providing local public goods, such as improving a neighborhood health clinic, or purely clientelistic and personalistic services (Weingast et al 1981;Kuschnir 2000;Stokes 2005;Nichter 2011;Stokes et al 2013;Luna 2014;Vieira 2015;Bertholini et al 2018). This explains why clientelism and pork-barrel are persistent in democratic polities.…”

Through Rainy Days: Advancing Education and Health amidst an Unfavorable Local Economy

“…The hypothesis is that a) positively correlates with town hall's capability to levy taxes (e.g., via higher tax burden, more efficient collection), which could indicate a highly skilled bureaucracy (Marenco, Strohschoen & Joner 2017) -similarly capable of executing well-adjusted social policies. As far as b), the hypothesis is also in the positive side: while discretionary transfers are not necessarily redistributive, they require a good level of bureaucratic resourcefulness from local governments, and here too an expectation regarding overall administrative capability is tenable; not the least, the very projects funded by discretionary transfers may be HD-enhancing (Bertholini, Pereira & Rennó 2018). From the expenditures perspective, local investment in education, culture, health and sanitation should positively influence social indicators, both directly by the primary function and indirectly, through the effects of one's good education on health status (and vice versa).…”

Transparência interna: cumprimento e punição no processo orçamentário municipal brasileiro

“…A margem de liberdade implicada na gestão das transferências voluntárias pode significar uma importante fonte de recursos para ações estratégicas dos entes subnacionais (Bijos, 2013), contribuindo para o aumento da capacidade de gastos municipais, especialmente em períodos de recessão e baixa arrecadação em contexto de rigidez fiscal (Soares & Melo, 2016). As transferências voluntárias já foram amplamente estudadas; há diversas evidências empíricas de que os recursos são distribuídos de maneira heterogênea pelos municípios (Brollo & Nannicini, 2012;Meireles, 2019;Moutinho, 2016), e de que seus efeitos também podem ser diversos (Bertholini, Pereira & Renno, 2018;Sakurai, 2013).…”