Politics and institution of corporate governance in Vietnamese state-owned enterprises

Abstract

Purpose The paper aims to examine how the change in political ideology and institutions affects corporate governance (CG) of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) in Vietnam, as well as its consequences. Design/methodology/approach To link macro-level institutional change to micro level of the reform process of the Vietnamese SOE governance, we draw from the “Varieties of Capitalism” (VoC) framework adopt a triangulation approach for data collection. Findings The paper shows the CG of SOEs is a variant of capitalist CG. Changes in the function, state control and structure of governance in the Vietnamese SOEs have been shaped by the political ideology and institution. It also shows that the political and bureaucratic interferences of the state in SOEs are for political interests rather than for firms’ effectiveness. Research limitations/implications The political ideology has existed in major aspects of the governance structure of the SOEs as a part of the party’s effort to maintain its economic legitimacy and a government of “control and domination”. Practical implications The findings of this study can be seen as a reference for the Vietnamese Government and governments of other developing countries in making incremental improvements in existing institutions rather than choosing the “best” model of CG. Originality/value The paper contributes to the literature by applying the VoC framework to analyse the change in SOE governance in a transition country while preserving the communist ideology. It can deepen our understanding of the SOE governance in Vietnam and enrich comparative studies of CG in the transition countries.

Effect of corporate governance on corporate social responsibility in Vietnam: state-ownership as the moderating role

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Managing competing institutional logics in governance of public-sector entities in Tanzania

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The Impact of Good Governance on the People’s Satisfaction with Public Administrative Services in Vietnam

“…In recent years, there have been growing objections that the weak governance and high corruption rate in Vietnam are poised to undermine its growth and development. The State of Vietnam, with an imperfect rule of law due to lack of resources to support progressive institutions and its political and bureaucratic interference in state-owned enterprises for political gain rather than for corporate performance efficiency, is beset by poor management (Phuong et al 2020).…”