Political revolution and repression: An economic approach

The influence of direct democracy on the shadow economy

“…Majoritarian elections reduce politicians' rents because voters in marginal districts are more mobile and electoral competition is stiffer, which implies that citizens can punish politicians more severely for wasteful spending. 9 Our approach recognizes that promotion of a referendum may be characterized by the standard collective action problems (Olson [1965] 1971) typical of rebellions (e.g., Tullock 1971;Silver 1974;Kurrild-Klitgaard 1997); for a review of this literature and open issues, see Kurrild-Klitgaard (2004). For this reason, we assume that the promotion of a referendum involves private costs and benefits related to the process itself.…”

An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions

“…A lot of work has focused on showing that the rewards and punishments involved in revolutionary activities in fact do not constitute a prisoner's dilemma. Morris Silver (1974), for example, developed Tullock's model in order to incorporate both psychological and material benefits received from participating in a revolution. The result was an extensive list spanning from an individual's sense of duty to class, country, or God, to a taste for violence or adventure, to the possibility of looting the presidential palace.…”

The politico-economic behavior of authoritarian governments

“…5. Morris Silver (1974) develops a typology of the causes of revolutions to which he applies Tullock's payoffs and probabilities. Only his Category IV, 'Widespread Increases in Hostility Towards the Regime,' can have economic content, and the only type of economic cause that Silver mentions is opposition to onerous taxation.…”