An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions

Olsson-Yaouzis, Nicolas

doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9755-x

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…The peasants' collective engagement in the revolution was very broad when they could lose. The issue of the free riding and the classic problem of collective action that would condemn any mass revolution was lifted by a common belief in the value of a successful revolution (Olsson-Yaouzis, 2012). This peasant violence galvanized the legislator at the same time as revolutionary measures fueled peasant revolts to lead to the destruction of feudal institutions.…”

Section: First Phase: De-institutionalization (1789)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Revolution and Institutional Change: the Elite and Mass Revolutions

Vahabi¹,

Batifoulier²,

Silva³

2021

Revue d'Économie Politique

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In this paper, we question a very deep-rooted bias in the economic literature with regard to conflict and revolution. Conflict in general and revolution in particular are not necessarily 'dark side of self-interest' or bad things. They may be sources of political and economic efficiency depending on their incidence on institutional change. Revolution escapes from Hirschman's dichotomous corrective mechanisms of 'voice' versus 'exit'. We consider revolution as scream exiting from existing rules and voicing new rules. Our theoretical framework suggests that revolutions are a source of institutional innovation characterized by a process of deinstitutionalization and re-institutionalization. The Veblenian 'selective adaptation' on the basis of differentiation, inheritance and selection through a survival struggle provides an endogenous explanation of its different stages. We explore the impact of revolutions on institutional change by focusing on two major types of revolutions, namely the elite revolution and the mass revolution. The former is led by a fraction of the old elite group, while the latter is driven by social groups and classes that were previously non-dominant. The 1688 British Glorious Revolution and the 1789 French Revolution are emblematic figures of these two types of revolutions. The great demarcation between property and sovereignty was accomplished by both revolutions traversing through different patterns of institutional innovation. Our references to the British revolution are exclusively limited to old and new institutionalist authors to show the consistency between their theoretical framework and conflict as a means of bargaining. By contrast, our analysis of French revolution tries to test the consistency of our theoretical framework in light of empirical evidence.

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Section: First Phase: De-institutionalization (1789)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Revolution and Institutional Change: the Elite and Mass Revolutions

Vahabi¹,

Batifoulier²,

Silva³

2021

Revue d'Économie Politique

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“…19 See Grossman (1991) for a rational choice model of revolutions and Mueller (2003) for a review. Olsson-Yaouzis (2012) shows that revolutions are more likely to break out when a ruler has lost the opportunity to intervene against the revolutionaries at an early stage of the uprising before a critical revolutionaries are then more likely to preserve the hierarchy, secrecy and discipline of the revolutionary organization, and reward their loyal collaborators and supporters, instead of risking election defeat and loss of the benefits from office. This implies that the replacement of a king by an autocrat (a military officer, or a civilian) does not end the monarchy, but replaces a hereditary ruler with a new one-man-rule.…”

Section: Revolutions and Coupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the overthrow or endurance of kings

Tridimas

2015

Const Polit Econ

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Monarchy has two elements, autocratic government and hereditary succession to office. After surveying arguments for and against hereditary access to public office, the paper illustrates that theoretical explanations of the rise of representative government do not account for the abolition or preservation of hereditary monarchy in contemporary democratic states. The paper then distinguishes between proximate and fundamental causes of the fall of monarchy. The former are military defeat, dissolution of the state as a result of war defeat and decolonization, and revolution. Fundamental causes are those that explain how proximate causes led to the overthrow of the monarchy and focus on the failures of monarchs to preserve national unity and to withdraw from a politically active role.

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“… 2. The collective action problem of revolution has been studied extensively in a variety of contexts and with numerous methods (Bendor and Mookherjee, 1987; Dalton et al, 2009; Esteban and Ray, 2001; Finkel et al, 1989; Goldstone, 1994, 2001, 2002; Klosko et al, 1987; Kuran, 1989, 1991, 1997; Leeson, 2010b; Lichbach, 1994, 1995, 1996; Mason, 1984; Moore, 1995; Muller and Opp, 1986; Olsson-Yaousis, 2010, 2012). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why didn’t slaves revolt more often during the Middle Passage?

Marcum

Skarbek

2014

Rationality and Society

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Given the substantial suffering of enslavement, why didn't more slaves revolt during the Middle Passage of the Atlantic Slave Trade? We argue that the collective action problem was an important impediment to revolt. Revolts nearly always resulted in slave casualties, and crews tortured and killed conspirators. Overthrowing the crew benefited all of the slaves, so each slave had an incentive to free ride on others' efforts to secure freedom. Using a rational choice framework, we argue that slaves could more effectively overcome the collective action problem when there were fewer slaves aboard, fewer male slaves, and when the slaves were more homogenous. Data on slave voyages from 1750 to 1775 and archival and historical documents support these claims.

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An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions

Abstract: Revolutions, Evolution, Public goods, Evolutionary game theory,

Cited by 11 publications

References 16 publications

The Political Economy of Revolution and Institutional Change: the Elite and Mass Revolutions

The Political Economy of Revolution and Institutional Change: the Elite and Mass Revolutions

On the overthrow or endurance of kings

Why didn’t slaves revolt more often during the Middle Passage?

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