Political Competition and State Capacity Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico

Abstract

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Latin American and the Caribbean Economic Association. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but LACEA takes no institutional policy positions.LACEA working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Mexico

“… 2 Other studies that consider domestic factors include Slater (2010); Arias (2013); Saylor (2014); Mares and Queralt (2015); Fergusson, Larreguy, and Riaño (2015); and Garfias (forthcoming). Alternative theoretical perspectives emphasize endowments and geography (Mayshar, Moav, and Neeman 2017; Sánchez de la Sierra 2015), critical junctures (Kurtz 2013), and historical legacies, such as colonial centralization (Migdal 1988).…”

Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia

“…Evidence from this comes not only from Colombia. With Horacio Larreguy and Juan Felipe Riaño, we study perhaps one of the most stereotypical clientelistic parties in Latin America: the PRI in Mexico (Fergusson, Larreguy, & Riaño, 2015). We find that when the PRI first got challenged by opposition groups in the 1960s, it reacted by manipulating the location of agrarian communities, sending them to distant locations (especially in municipalities where it faced more competition) to strategically increase the future cost of public good delivery.…”

“…Recent efforts to impose reasonable income taxation and Pigouvian taxes on some goods has faced strong resistance. 19 But it should be a fundamental part of the agenda to build a modern Colombia. Evidence from the work of Weigel (2017) in the Democratic Republic of Congo indicates that increased tax collection increases citizen political engagement.…”

Marching to Good Laws: The Impact of War, Politics, and International Credit on Reforms in Ukraine

“…12 As a consequence, the threat of armed conflict and the size of potential losses for elites, caused by a military defeat, could have declined to levels such that it lost its relevance in the presentday context. 13 If this is the case, one should pay more attention to other drivers like political competition, which is emphasized by a large body of literature in political economy (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2012;Fergusson et al, 2018;Fergusson, 2019;Easaw et al, 2019;Herrera and Martinelli, 2013). 14 Fourth, wars are costly and harm the aggregate economy.…”