Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Mexico

Abstract

International wars and interstate rivalry have been at the center of our understanding of the origin and expansion of state capacity. This article describes an alternative path to the development of state capacity rooted in domestic political conflict. Under conditions of intra-elite conflict, political rulers seize upon the temporary weakness of their rivals, expropriate their assets, and consolidate authority. Because this political consolidation increases rulers’ chances of surviving an economic elite’s challenge, it enhances their incentives to develop state capacity. These ideas are evaluated in post-revolutionary Mexico, where commodity price shocks induced by the Great Depression affected the local economic elite differentially. Negative shocks lead to increased asset expropriation and substantially higher investments in state capacity, which persist to the present.

The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India

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Slavery, Reconstruction, and Bureaucratic Capacity in the American South

“…Research on bureaucratic capacity has emphasized the importance of measuring the ability of the state to penetrate society and implement policies (Mann 1986). Scholars have operationalized administrative capacity as "bureaucratic presence"-that is, the extent to which local government personnel are able to gather information, detect noncompliance, and enforce decisions (Garfias 2018;Soifer 2008;Suryanarayan 2016). We measure the size of the local government bureaucracy by utilizing the 1880 census to calculate the per capita number of individuals employed in government in each county.…”

Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power

“…Furthermore, our study speaks to a growing literature in political economy that underscores the role of economic elites in the institutional design of public organizations and political systems (e.g., Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005;Albertus & Menaldo, 2018;Ansell & Samuels, 2014;Boix, 2003;Berkowitz & Clay, 2011;Beramendi et al, 2019;Congleton, 2010;Garfias, 2018;Garfias & Sellars, 2020;Lizzeri & Persico 2004). For example, Ansell and Samuels (2014) argue that intra-elite disputes between the owners of land and emerging manufacturing/industrial elites explain transitions to democracy.…”