Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia

Abstract

I propose three broad sets of political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict and the weak state. First, a “public goods trap” rooted in inequality implies that a low supply of, and demand for, public goods reinforce each other. Second, economic and political rents create vested interests in the status quo. Political rents are particularly problematic, partly because reformers face a curse of dimensionality: many things have to work well for state capacity and stable peace to consolidate. Finally, a very clientelistic pattern of political exchange consolidates a weak state, and weak states are fertile ground for clientelism.

Peaceful Entry: Entrepreneurship Dynamics during Colombia's Peace Agreement

“…with this interpretation, the fiasco of the rejected peace referendum in October 2016 and the uncertainty that was concomitant to the empowerment of the political losers of the peace agreement (Fergusson, 2019) led to a differential decrease in firms' entry in the later years.…”

Marching to Good Laws: The Impact of War, Politics, and International Credit on Reforms in Ukraine

“…12 As a consequence, the threat of armed conflict and the size of potential losses for elites, caused by a military defeat, could have declined to levels such that it lost its relevance in the presentday context. 13 If this is the case, one should pay more attention to other drivers like political competition, which is emphasized by a large body of literature in political economy (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2012;Fergusson et al, 2018;Fergusson, 2019;Easaw et al, 2019;Herrera and Martinelli, 2013). 14 Fourth, wars are costly and harm the aggregate economy.…”

Growth and Inclusion Trajectories of Colombian Functional Territories

“…Moreover, they show that the location of the Colombian state is particularly absent in these less prosperous parts of Colombia, and has been very persistently so (see also Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015)). This persistence reflects a political equilibrium, which has endured for at least 200 years both because it has created benefits for some and difficulties for those who did not benefit to induce change (see Robinson (2016) and Fergusson (2017)).…”

“…show, with direct data on vote buying from the Encuesta Longitudinal de la Universidad de los Andes (Fergusson, Molina, & Riaño, in press-a, in press-b), that the municipal-level proportion of preferential voting in the Congressional elections correlates with clientelistic vote buying, validating this measure. Moreover, as argued in (Fergusson, 2017), the prevalence of clientelism weakens the "consensually strong state", that is, one that is capable of providing public goods and project its power in the population and territory, while responding politically to the population and remaining accountable.…”