Physical Layer Watermarking of Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Signals

Li, Xiang; Yu, Chansu; Hizlan, Murad; Kim, Won‐Tae; Park, Seung Min

doi:10.1109/milcom.2013.88

Cited by 20 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 15 publications

(27 reference statements)

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“…Our key idea is that backscatter tags, upon transmission, could intentionally flip one or more chips to enable the receiver to identify the transmitter, without altering the original data. This is similar to recent efforts in using the 802.15.4 chip sequence as steganographic channel [9,12,24] or watermarking [11] but with a focus on authentication for ultra-low-power backscatter devices. Similar mechanisms could be implemented in other parts of the packets as we discuss in Section 6.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 67%

“…They demonstrate the possibility of creating a covert channel with the same data rate as 802.15.4, with a low impact on the bit error rate and only a slight decrease in receiver sensitivity. Li et al study the same issues for watermarking in 802.15.4 and also implement a prototype system to gain experimental results [11]. Nain et al extend the channel with acknowledgements to make it reliable [13].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Extended Abstract: Towards Physical-Layer Authentication for Backscatter Devices

2020

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Backscatter communications relieves sensor tags from the energy-intensive task of generating their own radio waves. This enables sensor tags to transmit their sensor readings at an energy consumption that is several orders of magnitude lower than that of conventional lowpower radios. The resource-constraints of typical backscatter tags, however, make it challenging to provide security for them. In this extended abstract, we take a first step towards authentication of backscatter transmissions. We propose to add authentication information in the chip sequences of the physical layer. We discuss design issues and in particular the trade-off between security and reliability and propose mechanisms to enable low-power authentication suitable for backscatter tags.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 67%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extended Abstract: Towards Physical-Layer Authentication for Backscatter Devices

2020

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“…On average, the extra SNR required for each additional flipped chip is 1.99 dB, which is similar to the theoretical result. Please refer to [38] for more details.…”

Section: Performance Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Security Mechanisms with Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Signals

Kang

et al. 2013

Journal of Computing Science and Engineering

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Security has long been a challenging problem in wireless networks, mainly due to its broadcast nature of communication. This opens up simple yet effective measures to thwart useful communications between legitimate radios. Spread spectrum technologies, such as direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), have been developed as effective countermeasures against, for example, jamming attacks. This paper surveys previous research on securing a DSSS channel even further, using physical layer attributes-keyless DSSS mechanisms, and watermarked DSSS (WDSSS) schemes. The former has been motivated by the fact that it is still an open question to establish and share the secret spread sequence between the transmitter and the receiver without being noticed by adversaries. The basic idea of the latter is to exploit the redundancy inherent in DSSS's spreading process to embed watermark information. It can be considered a counter measure (authentication) for an intelligent attacker who obtains the spread sequence to generate fake messages. This paper also presents and evaluates an adaptive DSSS scheme that takes both jam resistance and communication efficiency into account.

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“…Thus, the legitimate transceiver communication can be protected against jamming and spoofing attacks. The drawbacks of DSSS scheme against jammers are investigated in [4]. This drawback is defined in such a way that when PN sequence of jammer is matched with the transmitter's PN sequence, the legitimate receiver can be jammed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive Security of Wireless Communication Systems in the Physical Layer

Yılmaz

Güvenkaya

Furqan

et al. 2017

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing

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While the wireless communication systems provide the means of connectivity nearly everywhere and all the time, communication security requires more attention. Even though current efforts provide solutions to specific problems under given circumstances, these methods are neither adaptive nor flexible enough to provide security under the dynamic conditions which make the security breaches an important concern. In this paper, a cognitive security (CS) concept for wireless communication systems in the physical layer is proposed with the aim of providing a comprehensive solution to wireless security problems. The proposed method will enable the comprehensive security to ensure a robust and reliable communication in the existence of adversaries by providing adaptive security solutions in the communication systems by exploiting the physical layer security from different perspective. The adaptiveness relies on the fact that radio adapts its propagation characteristics to satisfy secure communication based on specific conditions which are given as user density, application specific adaptation, and location within CS concept. Thus, instead of providing any type of new security mechanism, it is proposed that radio can take the necessary precautions based on these conditions before the attacks occur. Various access scenarios are investigated to enable the CS while considering these conditions.

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Physical Layer Watermarking of Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Signals

Cited by 20 publications

References 15 publications

Extended Abstract: Towards Physical-Layer Authentication for Backscatter Devices

Extended Abstract: Towards Physical-Layer Authentication for Backscatter Devices

A Survey of Security Mechanisms with Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Signals

Cognitive Security of Wireless Communication Systems in the Physical Layer

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