Philosophical histories can be contextual without being sociological: Comment on Araujo’s historiography

Abstract

The future of the History of Psychology is bright, and the recent historiographical debates in this journal play an important role in that. Yet Araujo's recent contribution could be misunderstood: ignoring context is not the way to do a philosophical history. Instead, philosophical assumptions can be presented as part of the context that informed an historical subject. Hence the necessity, here, of a response: the History of Psychology is becoming disciplined, but slowly. There are still plenty of non-specialists who will misunderstand Araujo's contribution as a step forward in its rhetoric (many of whom teach the history course in their department). And because even specialists also sometimes dismiss methods-talk as a false step toward methodolatry, there is a danger in leaving such misunderstandings unaddressed. Simply put, then, ideas are never only lights in the attic: as the historian looks in, we must always remember that-at the timesomeone was looking out.

On methodological pluralism, context, and misinterpretation in the historiography of psychology: A reply to Brock and Burman

“…It was within this spirit that I wrote my paper (Araujo, 2017). Brock (2017) and Burman (2017) have offered replies that might seem, on first reading, as promoting that same spirit. A sound academic debate, however, presupposes at least two conditions of possibility.…”

On the implications of object permanence: Microhistorical insights from Piaget's new theory

“…In other words, the article is missing those aspects of abstraction that Piaget used throughout his interdisciplinary program. Yet, this is equally as important as his psychology (Ratcliff & Burman 2017). The recognition of what's necessary – given the intensional interpretation of identity as functional equivalence – drives the exploration of what's possible so that what's constructed is new rather than a copy (Piaget 1981/1987; 1983/1987).…”

“…“Microhistory” is a method used by historians: we investigate something small to derive new insights that reveal something big (see Burman 2017, pp. 119–120).…”

On Kuhn’s case, and Piaget’s: A critical two-sited hauntology (or, On impact without reference)

“…And indeed it’s these references that define the names themselves: who those people were—but as a reflection of who and what else they were with, how, and why—and reflected in their shared language (quantified by Green, Feinerer, and Burman, 2015a, 2015b). The resulting historical narratives then derive their meanings from those relations (Kuhn, 1970; see also Burman, 2017).…”