On methodological pluralism, context, and misinterpretation in the historiography of psychology: A reply to Brock and Burman

Abstract

In my rejoinder, I show how Brock’s and Burman’s replies to my article (Araujo, 2017) are based on a series of misunderstandings and misattributions. First, I argue that Brock ignores crucial passages of my article and my related book, and show not only that he misunderstands Wundt’s position on the introspective method, but also that his claim, according to which there is nothing new in my approach, lacks substance. Second, I argue that Burman’s text fails to make contact with the substantive thrust of my paper, and that his appeal to contextualism is vague and does not address the substantive questions I raise. Finally, I conclude that Brock’s rejection of my proposal, as well as his misunderstandings and misattributions, derives from a kind of methodological dogmatism, against which the best medicine is methodological pluralism, and that Burman’s worries are unjustified and can be avoided by a careful reading of my paper.

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“…Mais especificamente, tratase de interrogar os documentos a partir de questões filosóficas específicas (ontológicas, epistemológicas, metodológicas, etc.) associadas a tais projetos, atentando para o contexto original de seu surgimento e posterior desenvolvimento (Araujo, 2017a(Araujo, , 2017b. No caso de Tetens, em que a psicologia está inserida em sua filosofia, essa estratégia nos permite explicitar a trama conceitual e os princípios teóricos de seu projeto psicológico, revelando, assim, sua motivação essencialmente filosófica.…”

Reevaluating the initial impact of John Broadus Watson on American psychology: The necessity of comparative parameters

“…Samelson's diagnostic is in line with Brush's () more general statement about the inevitable tension that exists between professional and textbook histories of science. In the historiography of psychology, Ash () and Danziger (), among others, have called attention to this tension and recent debates about the nature of a professional history of psychology show that there is no easy way to define the field (e.g., Araujo, a, b; Brock, a, b; Burman, ; Danziger, ; Lovett, ; Robinson, a, b; Teo, ; Watrin, ). The central point here, so it seems, is to avoid the pitfalls of what Butterfield () called “the Whig interpretation of history.”…”