Phenomenology, empathy, and mindreading

Zahavi, Dan

doi:10.4324/9781315282015-4

Cited by 55 publications

(30 citation statements)

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“…To this end, I first proposed to pull classical phenomenological understanding slightly towards the ecologistic-enactivistic view, an accepted move that many have already made (Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009; Gallagher, 2017; Hutto & Jurgens, 2018; Ratcliffe 2017; Zahavi, 2017), but the conclusion was that the type of possibility of reaction, while relying on the affordance of context and interaction, must also rely on some latent structure of perception.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Caring as the Default of Empathic Direct Perception

Lampert

2022

Emotion Review

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The phenomenological understanding of empathy as the direct experiencing of the mental states (feelings, intentions, moods) of others eschews the identification of empathy with caring. At the same time, it leaves open the possibility of sadistic pleasure, indifference, or malice as consequences of empathic experience. In this paper, I intend to defend the place of caring as an inseparable part of the empathic experience, specifically when understood as direct perception. My defense relies on (a) conceiving of attentive concern as a perceptual predisposition, and (b) understanding the caring responsiveness of the empathizer as embedded in her direct perception of the empathee's mental states. My claim proceeds by three steps. Firstly, I will present the need to include caring within empathy through the problem that arises from excluding it. Secondly, I will argue for the presence of active responsiveness, inherent in the phenomenological concept of perception and expressed more explicitly in its Gibsonian understanding. Thirdly, I will propose my understanding of attentive concern as a predisposition, which together with the intentionality attributed to the other (itself also a disposition) forms the pre-perceptual basis for identifying empathy with caring.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Caring as the Default of Empathic Direct Perception

Lampert

2022

Emotion Review

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“…We will limit ourselves to highlighting the points that are essential for the approach we want to sketch in these pages. For detail, see (Zahavi, 2008;Gallagher and Zahavi, 2020).…”

Section: What Is a Representation?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Rejecting Cognitivism: Computational Phenomenology for Deep Learning

Beckmann¹,

Köstner²,

Hipólito³

2023

Preprint

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We propose a non-representationalist framework for deep learning relying on a novel method: computational phenomenology, a dialogue between the first-person perspective (relying on phenomenology) and the mechanisms of computational models. We thereby reject the modern cognitivist interpretation of deep learning, according to which artificial neural networks encode representations of external entities. This interpretation mainly relies on neuro-representationalism, a position that combines a strong ontological commitment towards scientific theoretical entities and the idea that the brain operates on symbolic representations of these entities. We proceed as follows: after offering a review of cognitivism and neuro-representationalism in the field of deep learning, we first elaborate a phenomenological critique of these positions; we then sketch out computational phenomenology and distinguish it from existing alternatives; finally we apply this new method to deep learning models trained on specific tasks, in order to formulate a conceptual framework of deep-learning, that allows one to think of artificial neural networks' mechanisms in terms of lived experience.

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“…I am subsequently drawn by her intentionality; I follow her gaze and see that it is the dog that she is afraid of. Zahavi (2014, 2017) thus argues that empathy is a form of social cognition in which we are drawn by the other (i.e., an other-directed intentionality), and understand the other directly and situatedly in a shared world. Although Zahavi emphasizes difference, in his theory, as in the other theories of empathy described, empathy acts as a sort of knowledge that makes it possible for us to make what seems strange and different knowable and therefore, if not identical, then at least relatable.…”

Section: From Empathy As “Knowing the Other” To Perpetual Beginnings mentioning

confidence: 99%

Encountering the stranger: Hannah Arendt and the shortcomings of empathy as a moral compass

Matthiesen

Klitmøller

2019

Theory & Psychology

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It is an often taken for granted notion in contemporary Western everyday life that there is an intimate connection between empathy and moral action. Yet in recent years, this connection has come under scrutiny. In this article, we first ask the question, what is empathy? A brief survey over the psychological and philosophical approaches to the notion of empathy shows that it remains a highly contested concept. The field has a propensity to discuss empathy within the frame of sameness. We instead argue that in order to grasp empathy it is necessary to foreground otherness. Drawing on Hannah Arendt, we further argue, that when encountering the stranger, moral action requires both visiting the other -as distinct from empathic knowledge as well as thinking in order to judge what is right. Ultimately moral dilemmas are solved, not by having or demanding empathy, but by addressing the issues at hand in joint action.Any justification ends finally with the rationally gratuitous presence of the emotion of sympathy: if that condition were not met, one would simply have no reason to be moral.(Thomas Nagel, cited in Denham, 2017 p. 227).

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Phenomenology, empathy, and mindreading

Cited by 55 publications

References 0 publications

Caring as the Default of Empathic Direct Perception

Caring as the Default of Empathic Direct Perception

Rejecting Cognitivism: Computational Phenomenology for Deep Learning

Encountering the stranger: Hannah Arendt and the shortcomings of empathy as a moral compass

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