2007
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0299-3
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Petty corruption

Abstract: Corruption, Economic development, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Repeated games, D73, C73, O17,

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Cited by 14 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…If the process is repeated, however, players remember their own actions and those they dealt with, and they learn what other actors have done. Here, there can be equilibrium paths of normal bribes where any defection would cause the whole corrupt system to unravel (LMR 2007, Yoo 2008. These equilibria impose different degrees of social harm depending on the pattern of bribes.…”
Section: Multiple Corruption Pointsmentioning
confidence: 96%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…If the process is repeated, however, players remember their own actions and those they dealt with, and they learn what other actors have done. Here, there can be equilibrium paths of normal bribes where any defection would cause the whole corrupt system to unravel (LMR 2007, Yoo 2008. These equilibria impose different degrees of social harm depending on the pattern of bribes.…”
Section: Multiple Corruption Pointsmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Lambert-Mogiliansky et al (LMR) (2007(LMR) ( , 2008, using a Nash equilibrium model of sequential bribe demands, show that, under some conditions, no applicant even starts the process because all believe that they will lose money (see also Yoo 2008). Olken & Barron only study the behavior of truckers already on the road.…”
Section: Multiple Corruption Pointsmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…To capture these characteristics of the problem, we develop a one-shot game. We also assume that the entrepreneur must acquire a bureaucrats approval for the project (see Yoo, 2008). The bureaucrat can ask the entrepreneur for a bribe in exchange for providing the concession.…”
Section: Saymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One limitation of this analysis is that repeated corrupt interaction between the parties is not considered, which might lead to reputation effects (Andrianova, 2001; Basu et al, 1992; Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2006;Dixit, 2004;Yoo, 2008). One could also include a middleman in corrupt dealings (see Bertrand et al, 2007;Guriev, 2004;Lambsdorff and Teksoz, 2004).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%