Initiation of corrupt exchanges and severity of corruption

Abstract

rajeev k. goel: initiation of corrupt exchanges and severity of corruption financial theory and practice 37 (2) 207-222 (2013)

Private sector bribery and effectiveness of anti-corruption policies

“…Public-sector bureaucrats are usually able to extract rents via state-sanctioned monopoly powers (see Goel, 2013), whereas there is often market competition or anti-monopoly safeguards in the private sector. For instance, provision of drivers' licenses is a state monopoly in most nations, enabling bureaucrats in charge to demand bribes (see Bertrand et al, 2007).…”

Market exit of firms: Does corruption act as grease or sand?

“…The main independent variable (CORRUPT) is corruption convictions (per 100,000 population), collected from the Public Integrity Section of the US Justice Department. Corruption is defined as a crime in which government officials abuse public trust and abuse their official powers for personal gain, although not all corrupt exchanges might be initiated by government officials (i.e., sometimes favor seekers initiate corrupt exchanges by offering bribes for favors ‐ Goel, 2013). 5 In 2017, there were a total of 863 people charged with corruption across the United States, 837 convicted and 521 still awaiting trial 6.…”

Corruption Across Government Occupations: Cross-National Survey Evidence

“…Broadly speaking, the theoretical foundations for incentives for corrupt behaviour can be seen in the context of the incentives to engage in criminal behaviour in general (Becker, ). Specific to corruption, scholars have noted the interaction between bribe givers and bribe takers in the context of their relative bargaining powers (Shleifer & Vishny, ; also Goel, ), noting especially how the government's ability to confer monopoly and discretionary powers might impact rent‐seeking abilities of officials (Rose‐Ackerman, ; Shleifer & Vishny, ; also see Banerjee, and Bardhan, ). The interactions between bribe givers and bribe takers take place in the context of the institutional setup of individual nations (e.g.…”

“…in some cases, individuals might have the choice of government agencies where they could obtain housing permits) (Shleifer & Vishny, ). In such cases, corrupt officials soliciting bribes have a dual strategic decision in making bribe demands: (i) strategic behaviour vis‐à‐vis potential bribe giver whereby a high bribe demand might discourage the potential corrupt contract and (ii) strategic behaviour vis‐à‐vis the competing government agency whereby the bribe demand would need to be ‘competitive’ (Goel, ).…”