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This paper analyzes the existing relationship between ethnic fractionalization, corruption and the growth rate of a country. We provide a simple theoretical model. We show that a nonlinear relationship between fractionalization and corruption exists: corruption is high in homogeneous or very fragmented countries, but low where fractionalization is intermediate. In fact, when ethnic diversity is intermediate, constituencies act as a check and balance device to limit ethnically-based corruption. Consequently, the relationship between fractionalization and growth rate is also non-linear: growth is high in the middle range of ethnic diversity, low in homogeneous or very fragmented countries.

In this paper we take another look at the literature on central bank independence. We show that the representative-agent approach to monetary policy is seriously flawed and does not provide a sound basis for deriving institutional solutions to the inflationary-bias. We then argue that the political approach to monetary policy provides a better account of the inflationary-bias and that this has important implications for the set-up of institutional arrangements, like central-bank independence, and the role of contractual arrangements, like indexation. Central bank independence, if appropriately modeled, can fail to reduce inflationary pressures in plausible circumstances. We then identify some issues in the theory of central banking that have not been clearly resolved and we offer some intuition as to the way they could be studied. We conclude by showing some potentially worrisome implications for the future of the European Monetary Union.

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This paper analyzes the existing relationship between ethnic fractionalization, corruption and the growth rate of a country. We provide a simple theoretical model. We show that a nonlinear relationship between fractionalization and corruption exists: corruption is high in homogeneous or very fragmented countries, but low where fractionalization is intermediate. In fact, when ethnic diversity is intermediate, constituencies act as a check and balance device to limit ethnically-based corruption. Consequently, the relationship between fractionalization and growth rate is also non-linear: growth is high in the middle range of ethnic diversity, low in homogeneous or very fragmented countries

Green considerations can be applied during all phases of the public procurement process: from the pre-award to the award and post-award phase. They can be included in technical specifications, award criteria, and contract performance clauses. Technical specifications provide a detailed description to the market of the good, work, or service to be procured. They constitute the basis for drafting green award criteria, which allow contracting entities to evaluate the received bids and award the contract. Contract performance clauses can also be used by public contracting entities to introduce environmental considerations in the procurement process. These clauses are based on the capacity of the winning bidder to perform the negotiated environmental criteria. Notwithstanding the importance of GPP, green considerations are seldom applied in public procurement. Reasons can be found in the lack of appropriate regulations at national and international level, or in the actual lack of training of the procurement workforce.

In this paper we will seek to provide a political economy explanation for the government issuance of indexed bonds. We will show that the issuance of nominal bonds decreases in¯ation whenever the bondholders' constituency is stronger than the taxpayers' constituency. We then assume that public debt management is in¯uenced by the Central Bank. Contrary to what is predicted by the traditional time-inconsistency approach, we show that when the creditor constituency is more powerful than the taxpayers' constituency, by oering in¯ation protection through the issuance of indexed bonds the Central Bank reduces the creditors' eorts against in¯ation and thereby raises equilibrium in¯ation.