Perceptions of shareholders and directors on corporate governance: what we learn about director primacy

Wright, Sue

doi:10.1111/acfi.12418

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 73 publications

(85 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Fich and Shivdasani (2006) also find that weak corporate governance is present when the average board of directorships of a firm is three or more. Through a qualitative survey, Adrian and Wright (2020) interviewed shareholders on the issue of multiple directorships and the shareholders actually prefer their directors to only have one directorship or kept to a low number as they want their directors to give their utmost attention to the company that the shareholders have interests in.…”

Section: Background Literature Review and Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This level of connectedness of knowledge and coupled with the reputation effect could help foster good monitoring mechanisms and behavior among the interlocked firms and lower the presence of earnings management. From a qualitative standpoint, the survey done by Adrian and Wright (2020) find that directors are actually in favor of having multiple directorships as it allows them to utilize the many skills attained across boards but would rather keep the number of directorships under three so as to not be overloaded. Also Adrian and Wright (2020) highlighted in their survey that directors feel that they will not be too attached to a single company and be partial if they have multiple board seats, hence increasing the level of monitoring mechanisms of the board.…”

Section: Multiple Directorshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The role of directors with multiple board seats and earnings quality: A Singapore context

Chee

Tham

2020

J Corp Accounting Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article explores whether multiple directorships has an influence on earnings management for Singaporean publicly listed firms. This article attempts to determine whether boards with multiple directorships are effective monitors and able deterrents of earnings management activities. Drawing on resource dependence theory, the results suggest that directors with multiple board seats will be able to tap on external resources for information, skills, and financial resources using their board connectedness. Data analysis is based on publicly listed firms on Singapore Stock Exchange (SSE) with a final pooled sample of 1,404 firm‐year observations from 2015 to 2018. Findings of this study show that with a higher level of multiple directorships, there is a significant negative relationship with the level of earnings management, where earnings management is measured by Dechow et al. (The Accounting Review, 1995, 70, 193–225) Modified Jones model and the Kothari et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2005, 39, 163–197) performance‐adjusted model. We also find that firms in Singapore that have a higher number of multiple directorships on its board, will have a lower level of tolerance on income‐increasing earnings manipulation. Notable secondary findings of this study include a significant negative relationship between the proportion of female directors on the board with the level of earnings management (income‐increasing manipulations). Additionally, it is found that the engagement of Big Four auditors has no significant relationship with the level of earnings management in the context of Singaporean firms. This study has significant implications and contributions to the theoretical applications and policy reforms, specifically pertaining to the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance on the issue of multiple directorships.

show abstract

Section: Background Literature Review and Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Multiple Directorshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of directors with multiple board seats and earnings quality: A Singapore context

Chee

Tham

2020

J Corp Accounting Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The controlling shareholder in a firm may be involved in management decision-making by influencing the decisions of the board of directors and CEOs (Adrian and Wright, 2018). In China, the ownership structure of firms is generally centralised, which is convenient for the powerful self-serving controlling shareholder to influence the firm's decisions.…”

Section: Does Managerial Ability Affect the Role Of The Ceo Decision Horizon?mentioning

confidence: 99%

CEO decision horizon and corporate R&D investments: an explanation based on managerial myopia and risk aversion

Zhu

et al. 2021

Accounting & Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Combining the views of managerial myopia and risk aversion, we argue that a short decision horizon could divert corporate investments away from R&D investments. We devise an industry-adjusted measurement combining CEO's expected tenure and age as a proxy for CEO decision horizon and find a positive relationship between the horizon and corporate R&D investments. The relationship is stronger among firms with lower industry-level income volatility and lower firm-level performance pressure. The results also show that CEO age is more important than CEO tenure in affecting the decision horizon. Further analyses indicate that risk aversion determines the studied relationship.

show abstract

“…Corporate governance structures, used for direction and control purposes, have been the subject of discussion by practitioners, academics, and regulators. Some consensus has emerged regarding effective governance mechanisms in improving firm performance (Adrian and Wright 2020;Seijts et al 2019) with various guidelines implemented to enhance corporate governance and management practices (OECD 2015). However, survey studies suggest that, at best, the evidence is mixed concerning the hypothesis that better corporate governance results in improved firm performance (Tingle 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Misalignment of CEO Personality and Corporate Governance Structures on Firm Performance

Gordon

Hrazdil

Jermias

et al. 2021

JRFM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We utilize the IBM Watson Personality Insights service to analyze CEOs’ verbal communication during conference calls to infer CEOs’ Big Five personality traits, which we employ to estimate their risk tolerance levels. We then explore whether the misalignment of CEO risk tolerance and governance structures is associated with company performance. Using a two-stage contingency approach, we test two hypotheses: (1) CEO risk tolerance and corporate governance structures are associated; and (2) misalignment of these structures with risk tolerance is negatively associated with financial performance. Based on a sample of 8208 firm-year observations during 2002–2013, we find support for both predictions. Our results support upper echelons theory and suggest that knowledge about CEOs’ inherent personality traits is important and relevant for governance mechanisms to work effectively.

show abstract

Perceptions of shareholders and directors on corporate governance: what we learn about director primacy

Cited by 4 publications

References 73 publications

The role of directors with multiple board seats and earnings quality: A Singapore context

The role of directors with multiple board seats and earnings quality: A Singapore context

CEO decision horizon and corporate R&D investments: an explanation based on managerial myopia and risk aversion

The Effect of Misalignment of CEO Personality and Corporate Governance Structures on Firm Performance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About