Peacekeeping for profit? The scope and limits of ‘mercenary’ UN peacekeeping

Abstract

Developing states furnish the vast majority of UN peacekeeping troops, a fact academics and policymakers often attribute (at least partly) to developing states’ supposed ability to derive a profit from UN peacekeeping reimbursements. In this article, we argue that this ‘peacekeeping for profit’ narrative has been vastly overstated. The conditions for significantly profiting from UN peacekeeping are in fact highly restrictive, even for developing states. We begin by highlighting two potent reasons for re-examining the peacekeeping for profit narrative: developing states emerged as the UN’s principal troop contributors in a period of stagnant reimbursement rates when UN peacekeeping was becoming less financially attractive; and the quantitative evidence scholars have presented as supporting the peacekeeping for profit narrative is flawed. We then identify the scope conditions within which peacekeeping for profit provides a plausible explanation for a developing state’s UN troop contributions. First, the deployment and its attendant reimbursements must be significant not only in absolute and per-soldier terms but also in relation to the state’s total armed forces and military expenditure. Second, the state must have an exceptional ability, compared with other troop contributors, to benefit from UN reimbursements. The scope for generalized profit-making from either equipment or personnel contributions is limited by intense political pressure against reimbursement rate increases. Individual states can nevertheless make a profit if they (1) invest in inexpensive and old but functional equipment, especially if deployed with usage restrictions, and/or (2) limit the deployment allowances (rather than salaries) they pay their peacekeepers. We establish that only a limited subset of developing states meets the plausibility conditions for the peacekeeping for profit narrative – and many top UN troop contributors do not.

Buying blue helmets: The role of foreign aid in the construction of UN peacekeeping missions

“…Bobrow & Boyer, 1997;Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998;Gaibulloev et al, 2015). The argument against the supposed profit motive for contributing has been developed and presented convincingly by Coleman (2014) and Coleman & Nyblade (2018), but we will briefly summarize it here.…”

“…Again, we do not claim that states get no benefit from contributing. Some states likely do benefit at the margins from enhanced international reputations, and the financial gain from personnel reimbursements likely is a motivating factor in some cases (see Coleman & Nyblade, 2018). Rather, we contend that because these benefits are incommensurate with the costs incurred by contributing countries, these factors alone are insufficient to explain how these missions continue to be staffed and deployed.…”

“…First, the reimbursement system has been in place since the mid-1970s, but the stark division of labor between wealthy and developing states did not arise until the late 1990s (see Figure 1), just as participation was becoming less financially rewarding. As Coleman & Nyblade (2018) note, the profit-from-reimbursement explanation cannot account for developing states beginning to participate in larger numbers when their ability to reap profits was declining rapidly.…”

“…Recent research (e.g. Coleman & Nyblade, 2018;Passmore, Shannon & Hart, 2018) casts doubt on this assumption, showing that the escalating costs to contributors and the high demand for peacekeeping personnel render profit-based explanations problematic. Despite this, we see many states participating in UN operations with gusto.…”

Only as fast as its troop contributors: Incentives, capabilities, and constraints in the UN’s peacekeeping response

“…We show how some motivations discussed in the literature on troop contributions (e.g. Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009;Victor, 2010;Coleman & Nyblade, 2018) also affect how quickly contributions are delivered. At the same time, our study demonstrates that factors that shape the willingness to contribute troops are not identical to those determining how fast those troops are deployed.…”