Buying blue helmets: The role of foreign aid in the construction of UN peacekeeping missions

Abstract

While the evolving nature and proliferation of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period is well documented, we know less about how personnel are recruited for these missions. Furthermore, recent developments have rendered existing supply-side explanations for troop contributions less convincing. The increasing demand for personnel, along with stagnant UN reimbursement rates and the rising costs of participation that began during the 1990s, mean that it is less attractive than ever for developing countries to offer their own troops to what have become increasingly ambitious operations. Yet, we see a large pool of developing countries continuing to do so. To address this puzzle, we argue that UN member states with strong preferences for establishing peacekeeping missions have begun using foreign aid as an inducement to help potential contributors overcome the collective action problem inherent in multilateral peacekeeping operations. We uncover strong empirical evidence that these ‘pivotal states’ strategically allocate foreign aid to persuade contributing states to boost their contributions, and also to ensure that these missions continue to be staffed and maintained as costs rise, particularly during the post-1999 period. We also find that states are responsive to these financial inducements: foreign aid increases both the likelihood of contributing personnel and the size of a state’s contribution. Theoretically, this article advances the scholarly understanding of international organizations and cooperation by illuminating an informal, extra-organizational strategy by which IOs can facilitate cooperation.

A price for peace: troop contributing countries’ responses to peacekeeper fatalities

“…Another, perhaps more tangible, material incentive that contributors may gain in return for their personnel commitments is foreign aid. Recent research reveals the ways in which wealthier actors that place a high value on a given peace operation use their resources to recruit commitments of peacekeepers from other states (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020;Henke 2016). Boutton and D'Orazio (2020) show that provisions of aid from states that are pivotal to a mission correspond with larger commitments of peacekeepers by recipients to those missions.…”

“…Recent research reveals the ways in which wealthier actors that place a high value on a given peace operation use their resources to recruit commitments of peacekeepers from other states (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020;Henke 2016). Boutton and D'Orazio (2020) show that provisions of aid from states that are pivotal to a mission correspond with larger commitments of peacekeepers by recipients to those missions. 11 Their study also finds that contributors who experience personnel fatalities receive larger amounts of aid.…”

“…Nigeria maintained its presence as one of the largest troop contributors to UNAMID from 2008 to 2017, even as it experienced 39 fatalities throughout the mission. 13 While different forms of side payments and other material benefits may similarly offset the costs of personnel fatalities to contributors, development aid from pivotal actors should serve as a suitable proxy for extrinsic incentives given the extent to which pivotal states may commonly use it to recruit personnel commitments (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020). Contributors that receive more aid from pivotal states should be more tolerant to fatalities of their personnel.…”

“…Research on the supply side of peacekeeping identifies several determinants of states' voluntary commitments of peacekeeping personnel. While states may face a variety of motives to participate in PKOs (e.g., Bellamy and Williams 2013), generally, those that can benefit materially, politically, or through security gains tend to volunteer more of their service members as peacekeepers (e.g., Bellamy and Williams 2013;Bobrow and Boyer 1997;Boutton and D'Orazio 2020;Bove and Elia 2011;Coleman and Nyblade 2018;Findlay 1996;Gaibulloev et al 2015;Kathman and Melin 2017;Lebovic 2004;Passmore 2020;Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018;Perkins and Neumayer 2008;Sandler 2017;Uzonyi 2015;Victor 2010). Drawing from this work, I focus on two different incentives that should influence contributors' reactions to fatalities: contiguity to a mission and side payments from states that are pivotal for the facilitation of a mission.…”

“…Neighboring states should therefore be more tolerant to fatalities of their members due to their inherent interest in ensuring the effectiveness of a nearby operation. Moreover, recent research highlights the ways in which states that are pivotal for the formation and implementation of peacekeeping operations condition provisions of foreign aid on recipients' involvement in those missions (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020;Henke 2016). These inducements should also offset at least some of the costs that troop fatalities generate for contributors and thus increase their willingness to maintain their commitments after experiencing losses.…”