Party Finance and Political Scandal: Comparing Italy, Spain, and France

Rhodes, Martin; Pujas, Véronique

doi:10.4324/9781315126647-59

Cited by 5 publications

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“…Section 4 For an overview of the rules for political contributions in the U.S. and how they changed during the 2000s, see, for instance, Aggarwal et al (2012, 5-8). In France, donations by individuals and corporations were illegal but tolerated before 1988 and donations by corporations have been illegal since 1995 (Pujas and Rhodes 1999). 4 introduces the data.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Donations to Political Parties: Investing Corporations and Consuming Individuals?

Fink¹

2017

Kyklos

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Summary What motivates donations to political parties? Two views prevail. Donors are perceived either as ideologically motivated consumers or as privilege‐seeking investors. To investigate differences in donor motivation between corporations and individuals, we analyze data from Germany. For the period from 1994 to 2014, we find that corporations act more like investors than individuals do. First, we test whether corporations or individuals are more inclined to give more to incumbent parties than to parties outside the governing coalition. Giving to incumbent parties whose representatives hold public offices may be more attractive for investing donors. Second, we test for differences between corporations and individuals in the relative increase in donations from non‐election years to election years. Investor donations may be more volatile than consumer donations. We find that only corporations donate more to incumbent parties and that corporations increase their party donations from non‐election years to election years more than individuals do. These differences in the behavior of corporate and individual donors provide some evidence for potentially undesirable exchanges between corporations as investors and parties. Further, the differences between individual and corporate donors tend to be more consistent for parties to the right on the political spectrum.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Donations to Political Parties: Investing Corporations and Consuming Individuals?

Fink¹

2017

Kyklos

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“…We’ve blown the past ethical standards; we now play on the legal standards.” The problem, as it is viewed by most scholars, is that private electoral funding alters the actions of political leaders in favor of the interests of donors, but they fail to question whether the use of these resources is an illicit practice. Only a few studies have explored the illegal problems that the electoral law brings about (Della Porta & Vannucci, 1999; Hofnung, 1996; Pujas & Rhodes, 2009). The main argument offered in these kinds of studies is that party finance regulations create opportunities for political corruption and even facilitate agreements with illegal groups who acquire a voice in public life through their electoral contributions.…”

Section: Previous Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Nested Analysis of Electoral Donations

Evertsson

2016

Journal of Mixed Methods Research

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This article reports the results of a nested analysis conducted to evaluate whether or not electoral donations are considered legal bribes. Introduced by Lieberman, nested analysis brings together the strengths of the regression analysis and the case study research by integrating large-N approaches (LNA) with small-N approaches (SNA). The nested analysis uses a sequential sampling model (QUANTITATIVE ! QUALITATIVE) and a nested sampling design (case selection ''on/off the line''). Here, Lieberman's original model was extended to deal with an apparent paradox that emerged from the analysis. This inquiry included a cross-national examination among 78 countries, denoted as LNA, followed by an intranational analysis conducted in Colombia, where an SNA survey with 302 respondents and an SNA case study were carried out.

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Anomie durch Integrationsversagen? Die Rolle der Korruption in Italien als Begleiterscheinung schwacher Bindungen an den Nationalstaat

Fütterer

2020

Demokratie Und Anomie

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Party Finance and Political Scandal: Comparing Italy, Spain, and France

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Donations to Political Parties: Investing Corporations and Consuming Individuals?

Donations to Political Parties: Investing Corporations and Consuming Individuals?

A Nested Analysis of Electoral Donations

Anomie durch Integrationsversagen? Die Rolle der Korruption in Italien als Begleiterscheinung schwacher Bindungen an den Nationalstaat

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