Parties for hire

Abstract

I argue that political parties oriented towards particularistic goods affect coalition government in presidential systems. Particularistic parties hire out their support on some item(s) of the presidential agenda in exchange for locally targeted policies or resources under the control of presidents. They are relatively cheap coalition partners for presidents in policy terms and their representation in the legislature provides presidents with coalitional flexibility. My empirical analysis of cabinets in 10 Latin American countries shows that when particularistic parties hold a larger share of the legislative seats minority presidents are less likely to form majority governments and more likely to change the party composition of their cabinets.

Presidents, Prime Ministers and Legislative Behaviour: The Conditional Effect of Presidential Legislative Powers on Party Unity

“…3 See for instance Amorim Neto (2006), Kellam (2015) and Alemán and Tsebelis (2011). 4 See www.v-dem.net/en/data/archive/previous-data/data-version-8/.…”

“…Party unity is a desirable feature of democratic polities because where parties are highly cohesive and disciplined, governments can approve policy at lower cost. Where legislators' behaviour is harder to predict on the basis of their partisan affiliations, the bases of government support are less certain and, thus, chief executives may have incentives to form oversized (and harder to manage) government coalitions or they may rely on ad hoc legislative coalitions by bargaining with individual legislators (Kellam 2015; Meireles 2016). Moreover, internally divided parties lead to less stable and enduring government coalitions (Laver 1999; Martínez-Gallardo 2012).…”

Sex, Survival, and Scandal: A Comparison of How Men and Women Exit Presidential Cabinets

“…Cabinet duration has long been a subject of interest in parliamentary systems and is increasingly a subject of investigation in presidential systems (e.g., Amorim Neto 2006; Camerlo 2011; Kellam 2013; Raile, Periera, and Power 2011). In parliamentary systems, ministers are typically expected to want to stay in their post as long as possible and to avoid a bad end (Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2007, 245), but neither that literature nor the presidential literature explains individual ministers' exits focusing more on overall questions of cabinet composition.…”

Government Formation and Cabinets

“…In countries where the president needs legislative majorities to make policy changes and where the president's party controls only a minority of the seats, the president is likely to form coalition governments that look much like those found in parliamentary democracies (Cheibub et al, 2004). As Marisa Kellam (2014) shows, though, these minority presidents have more flexibility than their prime ministerial counterparts when it comes to choosing coalition partners and shifting their governing strategies during their term in office.…”