Parliamentary oversight and corruption in the Caribbean: comparing Trinidad &amp; Tobago and Grenada

Stapenhurst, Frederick; Staddon, Anthony; Draman, Rasheed; Imbeau, Louis

doi:10.1080/14662043.2018.1444933

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…One of the structural dimensions we consider, namely, the inertia from the longevity of democracy, can be tied to the work of Stapenhurst et al (2018) who highlight the role of inertia in the political environments of nations. Institutional inertia is also tied to institutional maturity (Heo and Hahm, 2015), which brings learning and sets precedents.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…6 We also consider different aspects of government structure that are relevant in impacting corruption. The chief executive's years in office (YEARSoff) are tied to inertia (Heo and Hahm, 2015;Stapenhurst et al, 2018), learning (including learning to be corrupt and dodge potential exposure to the press), and stability. 7 Furthermore, the size of the parliament (LEGseats) has implications for competition for rents among bribe-takers, networking, and the possible bribe-offering avenues available to potential favor seekers (see, related, Godefroy and Klein, 2018).…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Direct and indirect influences of political regimes on corruption

Goel

Nelson

2021

Social Science Quarterly

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This paper studies the direct and indirect impacts of political regimes on corruption. Whereas the interplay of government is fundamental to corrupt acts, the present research sheds new light by showing the direct and indirect influences of dimensions of government structure on corruption. Methods: We employ two different estimation techniques. First, we use OLS regressions, with year and regional dummies. Second, we employ mediation analysis to account for the intermediate role of government size in the relation between government structure and corruption in order to gauge the direct and indirect influences on corruption Results: Results show that government structure, across various dimensions of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian regimes, significantly impacted cross-national corruption. In particular, a nation's stock of democracy and parliamentary systems lowered corruption, while executive tenure and dimensions of authoritarianism added to corruption. On the other hand, the size of the legislature did not matter when it came to corruption. However, the direct influences of these government structure variables are mitigated or reinforced when the intermediate role of government size is considered in a mediation analysis. Conclusions: The breakdown into the direct and indirect effects on corruption is a novel insight of this work, with useful policy implications.

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Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Direct and indirect influences of political regimes on corruption

Goel

Nelson

2021

Social Science Quarterly

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“…Namun, bias informasi karena penggunaan basis akrual dalam penyusunan LKPD, terutama karena adanya akrual diskresioner (Ferreira, et al, 2020), tidak sepenuhnya dipahami implikasinya oleh anggota DPRD (legislatif). Legislatif memiliki fungsi JRAK 12.2 pengawasan (oversight), yang jika berfungsi dengan baik dapat mencegah praktik korupsi (Stapenhurst, et al, 2018) dan dapat meningkatkan kinerja keuangan Pemda . Hipotesis yang diuji terkait dengan pengaruh legislature size terhadap manipulasi akrual adalah:…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Determinan Manipulasi Akrual Dalam Pelaporan Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah

Handayani

Darwanis

Abdullah

2022

JRAK

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This study aims to determine the effects of government size, fiscal capacity, fiscal distress, and legislature size on accrual manipulation in local government financial reporting. The study was conducted on 23 local governments in Aceh with data analysis using multiple linear regressions. The data is extracted from audited financial reports of the local governments for the period 2016-2020. This study uses the Modified Jones Model to measure the manipulation of accruals. The results show that the government size and fiscal distress have a negative effect on accrual manipulation, legislature size has a positive effect on accrual manipulation, and fiscal capacity have no effect on accrual manipulation. These results indicate that the accrual manipulation in financial reporting can occur due to discretionary policies carried out by local government officials with the aim of making their financial performance look good.

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“…Beyond responsiveness to racial and class tensions, Westminster systems have also been critiqued for lacking strong ex-ante oversight powers, thereby leaving room for the festering of corruption (Stapenhurst, Staddon, Draman & Imbeau, 2018). Strong prime ministerial powers, limited separation between the legislative and executive branches of government and 'winner takes all politics' can encourage the distribution of state resources to party supporters, (Antigua and Barbuda Electoral Commission, 2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%