Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments

Abstract

Parliamentary democracy means that the political executive is accountable to the parliamentary majority. However, when both the parliamentary majority and the cabinet consist of two or more distinct political parties, it is often difficult for the parliamentary majority to monitor and control the executive. In this article, we focus on political delegation from parliamentarians to the executive branch under multiparty parliamentary government. We identify the most important mechanisms parliamentary parties employ to remedy the accountability problems that may arise, as well as the arenas in which they are exercised: the executive arena, the parliamentary arena, and the extraparliamentary arena. We discuss the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms arena by arena, examine their use in 15 Western European countries that frequently feature coalition governments, and review our knowledge of how parliaments and parliamentary parties control political delegation and accountability in coalition governments.

Multiparty government and economic policy-making

“…Another potential avenue for future research is to investigate the role of alternative socalled ''coalition governance mechanisms'', for example, the appointment of junior ministers (see, e.g., Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011;Strøm et al 2010;Thies 2001). One control mechanism, labeled ''watchdog junior ministers'', suggests that parties in a coalition appoint a junior minister from another party to ''keep tabs'' on the senior minister.…”

“…At the same time, holding a particular portfolio gives the respective party strong (though not exclusive) influence over the policy-making in the respective domains and the other parties' abilities to veto decisions are constrained considerably. We thus draw on the growing literature on coalition governance mechanisms (e.g., Strøm et al 2010) .…”

coalition governance and foreign policy decision-making

“…Coalition governments are depicted as arrangements in which political deadlock, conflict, hijacking by junior parties (Kaarbo 1996), inefficiency (Bejar, Mukherjee and Moore, 2011) and low accountability (Strøm, Müller and Smith, 2010;Kisangani and Pickering, 2011) are more common than in single party governments. For example, Bejar, Mukherjee and Moore (2011) found that due to their shorter duration, coalition governments are more costly than singleparty governments and therefore less efficient.…”

“…For example, Bejar, Mukherjee and Moore (2011) found that due to their shorter duration, coalition governments are more costly than singleparty governments and therefore less efficient. Also, accountability is said to be lower in coalition governments, because monitoring and controlling multiparty cabinets is more difficult for the parliamentary majority than in case of single party cabinets (Strøm, Müller and Smith, 2010). …”

Inter-Party Conflict Management in Coalition Governments: Analyzing the Role of Coalition Agreements in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands

“…Party leaders often know who the minsters they appoint are and are thus in a position to screen and select ministers from their own party not only to ensure as much discipline as possible [21][22][23] but also to veto the nomination of ministers who have been particularly disloyal to coalition deals in the past [8]. And these party leaders can use tools to be well informed about and to control what their colleagues do.…”