Inter-Party Conflict Management in Coalition Governments: Analyzing the Role of Coalition Agreements in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands

Abstract

Abstract:In this article, we focus on manifest interparty conflict over policy issues and the role of coalition agreements in solving these conflicts. We present empirical findings on the characteristics of coalition agreements including deals over policy controversy and on inter-party conflict occurring during the lifetime of governments in Germany, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. We analyze the ways in which parties in government were or were not constrained by written deals over disputed issues. Coalition agreements from all four countries include specific policy deals, one third of which are precisely defined. These policy deals concern both consensual and controversial issues. Our central finding is that, in the case of intra-party conflict, parties almost always fall back on the initial policy deals when these exist. As such, policy statements of the coalition agreement facilitate decision making in each of the countries studied.

Stabilnost vlada i upravljanje koalicijskim sukobima u Hrvatskoj

“…Procesi i interakcije među koalicijskim partnerima u vladi mogu biti važni za njezinu stabilnost jer razlike među koalicijskim strankama mogu dovesti do nepremostivih i ozbiljnih sukoba u koaliciji koji povećavaju rizik prijevremenog okončanja mandata. U tome su pogledu neke studije pokazale važnost koalicijskih sporazuma kao kontrolnih mehanizama kojima se izbjegavaju ili razrješavaju unutarkoalicijski sukobi te se tako smanjuje rizik ranog okončanja mandata vlade (Timmermans & Moury, 2006;Andeweg & Timmermans, 2008;Saalfeld, 2009;Moury & Timmermans, 2013).…”

“…Dosadašnja komparativna istraživanja uglavnom su se fokusirala na policy aspekt koalicijskih sporazuma i pokazala su da je u većini zapadnih demokracija više od 90 posto sadržaja koalicijskih sporazuma posvećeno javnim politikama . Ponešto usredotočenije studije s manjim brojem slučajeva pokazale su da koalicijske vlade tijekom mandata realiziraju većinu policy ciljeva koji su definirani koalicijskim sporazumima, kao i da detaljni i obuhvatni koalicijski sporazumi pomažu ograničiti ministre i stranke u tome da samoinicijativno mijenjaju dogovorene politike (Timmermans, 2006;Moury, 2013;Moury & Timmermans, 2013;Indridason & Kristinsson, 2013;Bowler et al, 2016). 3 Jedna recentna studija koalicijskih vlada u Sloveniji pokazala je da njihovim koalicijskim sporazumima dominiraju sadržaji javnih politika, ali da se u posljednje vrijeme sve veći naglasak stavlja i na proceduralne mehanizme prevencije i rješavanja sukoba (Krašovec & Krpič, 2019).…”

Coalition Politics and Inter‐Party Conflict Management: A Theoretical Framework

“…To determine if exchanges and compromises are more likely as conflict outputs when the strategic strengths of parties are similar to those of their coalition partners, I calculated several indicators of the distributions of strategic strength for a number of coalitions, as defined in this article. For the selection of cases, I relied on Moury and Timmermans (, ), who observed how 114 inter‐party conflicts ended in 12 coalitions in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands between 1989 and 2009. Table reports these data and provides information on the salient features of the coalitions…”

“…In the original works, “victory” corresponds with “imposition” and “exchange/compromise” simply with “compromise.” The sum of percentages for conflict termination can be slightly under or above 100 because of approximations. As for the absolute numbers of conflicts, the more recent source (Moury and Timmermans ) is conflicting with Moury and Timmermans () with regard to the Verhofstadt I and the Prodi II cabinets. In this case, I have relied on the absolute numbers of the more recent source, whereas I have kept the proportions within the “decisions” category (victory + exchange/compromise) of the more dated source, since Moury and Timmermans () is more comprehensive.…”

Do Populists Govern Differently? Insights from the Italian M5S-League Case in Comparative Perspective

“…Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the coalition agreement, which is usually considered as the device par excellence when it comes to facilitating decision-making within heterogeneous coalitions (Moury and Timmermans 2013;Bowler et al 2016). In the context of Italian politics, the study of coalition agreements is even more urgent, given the paucity of executives that have adopted it (Moury and Timmermans 2008).…”