Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Déjà Vu?

Joshi, Shashank

doi:10.1080/0163660x.2013.825557

Cited by 6 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 14 publications

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“…Firstly, India is constantly modernizing its conventional and nuclear military forces. Secondly, Indian (Joshi, 2013) in association with Western (Hoyt, 2015)and South Asian scholars (Chakma, Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age, 2006)have launched propaganda to declare Pakistan as an irresponsible nuclear weapon state (NWS) (Dalton & Krepon, 2015). It is asserted that Islamabad relies on predelegated control of nuclear weapons and authority to use nuclear weapons lies in the hands of junior ranking military officers.…”

Section: First-use In the Light Of Realist Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine from Minimum Deterrence to Full Spectrum Credible Minimum Deterrence (FSCMD)

Ahmed¹

2019

PSSR

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In this study, attempt is made to briefly highlight theories and correlates them with Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. Theoretical foundation of this study is based on realist philosophy and the offshoots of realism. Nuclear doctrines are developed to deter aggression or deal with circumstances involving probable nuclear warfare. Pakistan's nuclear ability has deterred Indian military from any aggression. Despite having entrenched political differences, the two republics have not aspired for any large-scale military adventure ever since the acquisition of nuclear capability. SverreLodgaard framed the term "political advantage," for exultant deterrent role of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. It is asserted hither efficacious practice of nuclear deterrent to preserve strategic objectives embedded sense of "virtual victory" in the psyche of Islamabad stationed bureaucrats. This doctrine stems from Pakistan's opposition to Indian declaration that South Asia falls in Indian sphere of influence. Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan is though unwritten/customary yet, it is based on various handouts issued by national command authority (NCA) and Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR). Statements and interviews of civilian strategists, senior serving and retired government armed forces officials serve the purpose of providing policy guidelines for customary nuclear doctrine

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Section: First-use In the Light Of Realist Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine from Minimum Deterrence to Full Spectrum Credible Minimum Deterrence (FSCMD)

Ahmed¹

2019

PSSR

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Power, Territory, and Learning: Explaining Pakistan’s Persistent Contestation

Ebert

Blarel

2018

Regional Powers and Contested Leadership

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Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the Competition for Escalation Dominance

Montgomery¹,

Edelman²

2014

Journal of Strategic Studies

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India and Pakistan are currently engaged in a competition for escalation dominance. While New Delhi is preparing for a limited conventional campaign against Pakistan, Islamabad is pursuing limited nuclear options to deter India. Together, these trends could increase the likelihood of nuclear conflict. India, for example, might conclude that it can launch an invasion without provoking a nuclear reprisal, while Pakistan might believe that it can employ nuclear weapons without triggering a nuclear exchange. Even if war can be avoided, these trends could eventually compel India to develop its own limited nuclear options in an effort to enhance deterrence and gain coercive leverage over Pakistan.Despite persistent tensions, recurring crises, and one minor war, South Asia has arguably been less volatile than many observers anticipated when India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed powers. Consistent with the logic of the stability-instability paradox, the possibility that a direct confrontation might lead to a nuclear exchange has seemingly reduced incentives on both sides to initiate large-scale conflicts or escalate small-scale clashes, even though a nuclear deterrent has also emboldened Islamabad to support militant groups engaged in terrorism, subversion, and insurgency against New Delhi. Nevertheless, two interrelated trends are undermining this fragile equilibrium: India's efforts to extend its conventional military advantage over Pakistan, and Pakistan's growing reliance on nuclear weapons to counter India. 1 1 For a recent discussion of these trends, see Charles E. Costanzo, 'South Asia: Danger Ahead?' Strategic Studies Quarterly 5/4 (Winter 2011), 92-106.

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Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Déjà Vu?

Cited by 6 publications

References 14 publications

Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine from Minimum Deterrence to Full Spectrum Credible Minimum Deterrence (FSCMD)

Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine from Minimum Deterrence to Full Spectrum Credible Minimum Deterrence (FSCMD)

Power, Territory, and Learning: Explaining Pakistan’s Persistent Contestation

Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the Competition for Escalation Dominance

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