Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the Competition for Escalation Dominance

Abstract

India and Pakistan are currently engaged in a competition for escalation dominance. While New Delhi is preparing for a limited conventional campaign against Pakistan, Islamabad is pursuing limited nuclear options to deter India. Together, these trends could increase the likelihood of nuclear conflict. India, for example, might conclude that it can launch an invasion without provoking a nuclear reprisal, while Pakistan might believe that it can employ nuclear weapons without triggering a nuclear exchange. Even if war can be avoided, these trends could eventually compel India to develop its own limited nuclear options in an effort to enhance deterrence and gain coercive leverage over Pakistan.Despite persistent tensions, recurring crises, and one minor war, South Asia has arguably been less volatile than many observers anticipated when India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed powers. Consistent with the logic of the stability-instability paradox, the possibility that a direct confrontation might lead to a nuclear exchange has seemingly reduced incentives on both sides to initiate large-scale conflicts or escalate small-scale clashes, even though a nuclear deterrent has also emboldened Islamabad to support militant groups engaged in terrorism, subversion, and insurgency against New Delhi. Nevertheless, two interrelated trends are undermining this fragile equilibrium: India's efforts to extend its conventional military advantage over Pakistan, and Pakistan's growing reliance on nuclear weapons to counter India. 1 1 For a recent discussion of these trends, see Charles E. Costanzo, 'South Asia: Danger Ahead?' Strategic Studies Quarterly 5/4 (Winter 2011), 92-106.

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