Ownership and the Changing Employment Relationship: Why Stylized Notions of Labor No Longer Generally Apply—A Reply to Zardkoohi and Paetzold

Rousseau, Denise M.; Shperling, Zipi

doi:10.5465/amr.2004.14497608

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Intrastakeholder conflicts are also evident between knowledge workers and routine employees. In these circumstances highly skilled and 'star' employees may be offered 'pieces of the action' (Rousseau & Shperling 2004) in the form of stock options and as a means of securing their continuing contribution.…”

Section: Stakeholder Outcomes Under Managerial Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance and stakeholder conflict

2010

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Section: Stakeholder Outcomes Under Managerial Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance and stakeholder conflict

2010

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“…There is evidence of increasing usage of stock ownership and stock option schemes by many, certainly not all, organizations. Over one-fifth of US private sector employees -24 million workers -own stock in their own companies, and 8,000,000 participate in employee stock ownership plans (Rousseau & Shperling, 2004). In Ireland, stock ownership schemes have become institutionalized over the past decade in much of the information and communication technologies and pharmachem sectors (O'Regan et al ., 2005).…”

Section: Assumption 4: Hrd Is Not Associated With the Unitarist Hrm Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Critically challenging some assumptions in HRD

O’Donnell¹,

McGuire²,

Cross³

2006

Int J Training Development

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This paper sets out to critically challenge five interrelated assumptions prominent in the (human resource development) HRD literature. These relate to: the exploitation of labour in enhancing shareholder value; the view that employees are cocontributors to and co-recipients of HRD benefits; the distinction between HRD and human resource management; the relationship between HRD and unitarism; and the relationship between HRD and organizational and learning cultures. From a critical modernist perspective, it is argued that these can only be adequately addressed by taking a point of departure from the particular state of the capital-labour relation in time, place and space. HRD, of its nature, exists in a continuous state of dialectical tension between capital and labour -and there is much that critical scholarship has yet to do in informing practitioners about how they might manage and cope with such tension.

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“…The results for this analysis are reported in (Astrachan, 2010;Sharma, 2004), the vast majority of these empirical studies take a homogeneous view of the family enterprise (e.g., Lee, 2006;Stavrou et al, 2007;Tsao, Chen, Lin, & Hyde, 2009 , 2013). This is unfortunate, as broad-based employee ownership allows a majority of the firm's employees, rather than just the executives, to become owners, thereby creating a competitive advantage through the entire workforce (Rousseau & Shperling, 2004). Consequently, this study advances research by providing empirical evidence of how family firms differentially approach the use of BEOPs.…”

Section: Analysis and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 95%

A Piece of the Pie? The Effects of Familial Control Enhancements on the Use of Broad‐Based Employee Ownership Programs in Family Firms

Mullins

2017

Human Resource Management

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While family firms tend to be highly committed to their employees, scholars contend that founding family owners are likely hesitant when it comes to sharing ownership broadly with nonfamily employees. Taking a heterogeneous view of family firms, this study investigates the implications of different familial control‐enhancing mechanisms on the use of broad‐based employee ownership programs (BEOPs) among publicly‐traded family firms. Based on a five‐year panel data set of S&P 500 family firms, the findings indicate that certain control‐enhancing mechanisms can cause family owners to frame their decision to use BEOPs differently. Essentially, family firms with family CEOs, regardless of whether the CEO is a founder or descendant, have a decreased likelihood of using BEOPs in spite of the direct control that family owners have over the firm's operations. Conversely, when family owners hold dual‐class shares, which enhance shareholder voting power, family firms are more likely to use BEOPs. Furthermore, the likelihood of family firms with family CEOs using BEOPs increases when the family holds dual‐class shares. Moreover, there is no significant difference between founder and descendant CEOs, as both are less resistant to using BEOPs when a dual‐class share structure is in place. These findings have implications for HR practitioners working in family firms given the influence that family owners can have on the firm's HR activities, namely BEOPs.

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Ownership and the Changing Employment Relationship: Why Stylized Notions of Labor No Longer Generally Apply—A Reply to Zardkoohi and Paetzold

Cited by 9 publications

References 10 publications

Corporate governance and stakeholder conflict

Corporate governance and stakeholder conflict

Critically challenging some assumptions in HRD

A Piece of the Pie? The Effects of Familial Control Enhancements on the Use of Broad‐Based Employee Ownership Programs in Family Firms

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