2007
DOI: 10.1177/0170840607078115
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Overcoming Inaction through Collective Institutional Entrepreneurship: Insights from Regime Theory

Abstract: Studies on institutional change generally pertain to the agency-structure paradox or the ability of institutional entrepreneurs to spearhead change despite constraints. In many complex fields, however, change also needs cooperation from numerous dispersed actors with divergent interests. This presents the additional paradox of ensuring that these actors engage in collective action when individual interests favor lack of cooperation. We draw on complementary insights from institutional and regime theories to id… Show more

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Cited by 273 publications
(302 citation statements)
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References 80 publications
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“…Fields are by nature constellations of organizations that uphold standards together, negotiate or fight over change, or express conflicting interests. Yet their interests are typically rather narrow when compared to the "wicked" problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) facing global society, such as climate change (Wijen & Ansari, 2007;Wright, Nyberg, & Grant, 2012), the global financial crisis, poverty (Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012), the Zika virus or Ebola outbreak, income inequality (Lawrence, Amis, Munir, Hirsch, & McGahan, 2014), terrorism and others. These issues, and many more mundane issues such as water governance and air pollution cannot be settled within fields; they demand the ability to analyze issues involving (and across) multiple fields-they demand interfield action.…”
Section: Additional Research Directionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Fields are by nature constellations of organizations that uphold standards together, negotiate or fight over change, or express conflicting interests. Yet their interests are typically rather narrow when compared to the "wicked" problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) facing global society, such as climate change (Wijen & Ansari, 2007;Wright, Nyberg, & Grant, 2012), the global financial crisis, poverty (Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012), the Zika virus or Ebola outbreak, income inequality (Lawrence, Amis, Munir, Hirsch, & McGahan, 2014), terrorism and others. These issues, and many more mundane issues such as water governance and air pollution cannot be settled within fields; they demand the ability to analyze issues involving (and across) multiple fields-they demand interfield action.…”
Section: Additional Research Directionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Building on the social movement literature (McAdam & Scott, 2005), actors are seen to engage in framing contests, construct cooperative and competitive networks, manipulate institutional arrangements or incentive structures, and collectively mobilize in order to effect change (Wijen and Ansari 2007; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006). These battles between insurgents and counter-movements of incumbents (Hensmans, 2003) disrupt existing arrangements, yet ready-made solutions may not be available, leaving much institutional work to be done.…”
Section: Literature Review the Purpose Of Institutionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Responsiveness and adaptability in the context of fisheries can be in reference to both socioeconomic and ecological stressors. Various factors affect the extent to which responsiveness and adaptability exist, including individual and collective agency (Wijen andAnsari 2007, Coulthard 2012), leadership , Gutiérrez et al 2011), and existing context (McCay 2002. Underlying all of these factors is the idea that for actors to be adaptable they must be able to mobilize information and resources at the appropriate moments.…”
Section: Linking Social Capital To Resiliencementioning
confidence: 99%