We extend research on the diffusion of corporate practices by providing a framework for studying practice variation during diffusion processes. Specifically, we theorize about how population-level mechanisms of diffusion link with organization-level mechanisms of implementation that lead to the adaptation of practices. We also identify technical, cultural, and political elements of fit (or misfit) between diffusing practices and adopters and analyze how the process of attaining fit across these elements can trigger different patterns of adaptation.

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Rooted in the notion of inclusive capitalism, the Bottom-of-the-Pyramid (BoP) approach argues for the simultaneous pursuit of profit and social welfare by creating markets for the poor. This idea has been both celebrated and criticized in the literature. We do neither in this paper. Instead, by leveraging insights from Amartya Sen's work on capability development and the literature on social capital, we offer a more socially embedded and community-centric BoP approach. By redefining poverty not just as a lack of income, but also as a lack of 'capabilities' in Sen's sense that can be developed through leveraging social capital, we offer a systemic framework for understanding the societal impact of business-driven ventures in the BoP and empowering BoP communities through these ventures. Specifically, we argue that any business initiative in the BoP ought to be evaluated on the basis of whether it advances capability transfer and retention by (a) enhancing the social capital between a particular community and other more resource rich networks, and (b) preserving the existing social capital in the community.

Studies on institutional change generally pertain to the agency-structure paradox or the ability of institutional entrepreneurs to spearhead change despite constraints. In many complex fields, however, change also needs cooperation from numerous dispersed actors with divergent interests. This presents the additional paradox of ensuring that these actors engage in collective action when individual interests favor lack of cooperation. We draw on complementary insights from institutional and regime theories to identify drivers of collective institutional entrepreneurship and develop an analytical framework. This is applied to the field of global climate policy to illustrate how collective inaction was overcome to realize a global regulatory institution, the Kyoto Protocol.

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While scholars have explained how business has increasingly taken on regulatory roles to address social and environmental challenges, less attention has been given to the process of how business is made responsible for wicked problems. Drawing on a study of 'conflict minerals' in the Democratic Republic of Congo, we examine the process through which companies became responsible for a humanitarian crisis. We contribute by: (1) bridging insights from contentious performance and deliberative approaches -to present a model of corporate political responsibilization for a wicked problem that explains how a 'field frame' of responsibility can emerge; (2) explaining shifting boundaries between public and private responsibilities and the changing role of the state as catalytic rather than coercive; and (3) showing how responsibility can be attributed to a target by framing an issue and its root cause in ways that allow such an attribution, and how the attribution can diffuse and solidify.

D espite increasing interest in transnational fields, transnational commons have received little attention. In contrast to economic models of commons, which argue that commons occur naturally and are prone to collective inaction and tragedy, we introduce a social constructionist account of commons. Specifically, we show that actor-level frame changes can eventually lead to the emergence of an overarching, hybrid "commons logic" at the field level. These frame shifts enable actors with different logics to reach a working consensus and avoid "tragedies of the commons." Using a longitudinal analysis of key actors' logics and frames, we tracked the evolution of the global climate change field over 40 years. We bracketed time periods demarcated by key field-configuring events, documented the different frame shifts in each time period, and identified five mechanisms (collective theorizing, issue linkage, active learning, legitimacy seeking, and catalytic amplification) that underpin how and why actors changed their frames at various points in time-enabling them to move toward greater consensus around a transnational commons logic. In conclusion, the emergence of a commons logic in a transnational field is a nonlinear process and involves satisfying three conditions: (1) key actors view their fates as being interconnected with respect to a problem issue, (2) these actors perceive their own behavior as contributing to the problem, and (3) they take collective action to address the problem. Our findings provide insights for multinational companies, nation-states, nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders in both conventional and unconventional commons.