Optimal Selling Strategy in Dual-Channel Supply Chains

He, Yong; Song, Houfei; Zhang, Peng

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-32054-5_37

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…There are many papers that study issues related to the dual-channel supply chain in the Operations Management / Operations Research (OM/OR) literature (as reviewed by Cattani et al, 2004;Tsay and Agrawal, 2004a). Chiang et al (2003), Cattani et al (2006), Cai et al (2009), He et al (2013), andDing et al (2016) investigate the pricing issues of the dual-channel supply chain. Chiang et al (2003) and Cattani et al (2006) focus on the channel conflict, which is incurred when the manufacturer opens up a direct channel in competition with the traditional channel.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantity Leadership for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Retail Service

Dong

Yang

2020

Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.

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In a dual-channel supply, the manufacturer sells the products by both a traditional channel via the retailer and an online channel directly. Comparing with the direct channel, the retailer may provide additional services to the traditional channel. This paper studies the quantity leadership for a dual-channel supply chain with retail service. The manufacturer decides the wholesale price of the products and its selling quantity via the online channel, and the retailer decides the service level and its selling quantity via the traditional channel. We consider three Cournot competition games: Manufacturer-as-leader game, retailer-as-leader game, and simultaneous game. Optimal solutions are derived for these games. Based on the optimal solutions, we investigate the quantity leadership/followership decisions for the manufacturer and retailer, associated with the changes of some parameters. We observe that when the service sensitivity parameters are low, being a follower is a dominant strategy for the retailer; otherwise, both strategies of manufacturer-as-leader (retailer as the follower) and retailer-as-leader (manufacturer as the follower) are Nash equilibriums. We further conduct the numerical studies to investigate the impacts of parameters related to the retail service, and discuss the insights of the findings.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantity Leadership for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Retail Service

Dong

Yang

2020

Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.

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“…the timing of the game is as follows: (i) the retailer decides (Stackelberg leader) whether to conduct market investigation or not and determines the order quantity ; (ii) the supplier (Stackelberg follower) infers the market demand according to the retailer's order quantity in traditionalchannel and determines the order quantity in direct-channel; (iii) the supplier and the retailer sell products in the market simultaneously, and the market prices , in two channels are determined by the actual demand function. Since the customers are heterogeneous in the dual-channel supply chain, we assume that the inverse demand functions in the dual-channel supply chain are formulated as follows [25][26][27]:…”

Section: Dual-channel Supply Chain Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…By making Equation (26) equal to Equation (27) and by substituting Lemma 1, the threshold c is obtained.…”

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage

Fang¹,

Ren²

2019

Symmetry

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The growing tendency for suppliers to encroach on the retailers’ market has forced the retailers, being independent entities, to distort shared information to maintain their information superiority. Previous studies on asymmetric information assumed that retailers share information truthfully or that demand satisfies a two-point distribution, which does not always conform to the reality of the dual-channel supply chain. Considering the potential information leakage problem, this paper studied the optimal strategies of the participants and focused on the strategic information management of the dual-channel supply chain. By introducing the retailers’ adverse selection behavior, a sequential game model under general uncertain demand was established, which replaced the classic high-low demand model. The perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium was characterized, which depended on stochastic demand disturbance, product heterogeneity, supply chain structure, and market investigation cost. The results showed that asymmetric information made the supply chain management inefficient. When the demand disturbance was within the threshold, the retailer distorted order quantity to maintain the information advantage under potential information leakage, and information acquisition was not always good for the retailer—in some cases due to adverse selection problems. A numerical example and a sensitivity analysis were done to validate the model. Our work provides participants in the dual-channel supply chain with decision-making support and direction for improving information management.

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“…In recent years, e-commerce has accounted for an everincreasing proportion of the economy, and online retailers have become the main force of the retail industry [8]. In the traditional supply chain, manufacturers dominate the consumer demands; that is, online retailers sell whatever is produced by manufacturers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Problem in the E-Commerce Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Fairness Preferences

Song

Xin

2022

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Given the different fairness preferences of online retailers and their investment in emission reduction and revenue sharing with manufacturers, an e-commerce low-carbon supply chain decision model was established using Stackelberg game theory under three circumstances: no fairness preference, symmetric fairness preferences, and asymmetric fairness preferences. Results reveal that the asymmetric fairness preference behaviors of online retailers weaken the manufacturers’ profits, where the online retailer’s utility is negatively correlated with its asymmetric fairness preference coefficient. The real fairness preference coefficient of the online retailer estimated by the manufacturer is negatively correlated with the manufacturer’s wholesale price and carbon emission reduction. The revenue sharing proportion of the manufacturer presents a positive correlation with its wholesale price but shows no correlation with the retail price, the green degree, or the supply chain profit. Within a feasible region, the proportion of the online retailer’s investment in emission reduction is positively correlated with the manufacturer’s profit, the online retailer’s utility, the total utility of the supply chain, the carbon emission reduction, the product’s retail price, and the product’s wholesale price.

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Optimal Selling Strategy in Dual-Channel Supply Chains

Cited by 3 publications

References 10 publications

Quantity Leadership for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Retail Service

Quantity Leadership for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Retail Service

Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage

Pricing Problem in the E-Commerce Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Fairness Preferences

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