On Today's Two‐Worlds Interpretation: Knowledge and True Belief in Plato

Butler, Travis

doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2007.tb00041.x

Cited by 3 publications

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“…On the limits of knowledge according to Socrates, see f. ex. Fine (1978), Fine (1990), Gonzalez (1996), Gerson (2003, p. 50-98, p. 248-238), Butler (2007) and Fine (2016).…”

Section: The Weighing Model Of Practical Deliberationmentioning

confidence: 98%

Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue

Nascimento

2020

Rev. Archai

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This article offers a new formulation of the Socratic principle known as the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue (PSV). It is divided in three sections. In the first section I criticize Vlastos’ formulation of the PSV. In the second section I present the weighing model of practical deliberation, introduce the concepts of reason for action, simple reason, sufficient reason and conclusive reason that were offered by Thomas Scanlon in Being realistic about reasons (2014), and then I adapt these concepts so as to render them apt to be used in the formulation I intend to offer. In the third section I present my formulation of the PSV using the concepts introduced in the second section and explain why I believe this formulation is better than the one offered by Vlastos.

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“…On the limits of knowledge according to Socrates, see f. ex. Fine (1978), Fine (1990), Gonzalez (1996), Gerson (2003, p. 50-98, p. 248-238), Butler (2007) and Fine (2016).…”

Section: The Weighing Model Of Practical Deliberationmentioning

confidence: 98%

Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue

Nascimento

2020

Rev. Archai

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“…Talvez ela guarde sua condição de certeza somente no plano interno da consciência cognitiva. Para uma proposta sobre como Platão entende a infalibilidade sob a perspectiva do conhecimento de informações, verButler (2007).20 Por não serem relevantes para meu argumento, vou ignorar dois tópicos desse texto: (i) o problema dos sentidos de 'esti' e (ii) o referente de 'agnôsia' (ignorância). Um dos problemas dessa passagem da República é a ambiguidade da preposição epi (477a9, b7).…”

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“…Deve tratar também da distinção entre conhecimento proposicional 'sobre as Formas' e conhecimento por acquaintance 'com as Formas'. Para introdução a algumas propostas, verWhite (1992) eButler (2007).26 Para algumas ideias mais específicas sobre 'infalibilidade', remeto aButler (2007).27 Fine (2010, p. 325) entende que o argumento se vale do conceito de verdade, mas não se trata da noção de verdade necessária.28 Esse argumento não se envolve com os detalhes dos contextos epistêmicos que podem justificar o conhecimento de que p é o caso, e, tampouco, trata das espécies de opinião (verdadeira e falsa). Como notou TerryPenner (1987, p. 110), o foco específico desse argumento é a ênfase no que distingue as características da cognição que o filósofo possui acerca de conceitos como 'to kalon' e o tipo de concepção que possui o não-filósofo, chamado 'amante de espetáculos' (philotheamôn, 475d2).…”

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Sobre o argumento “saber ou não-saber” em Teeteto 187d-200c

Borges

2013

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Há muita discussão sobre como interpretar o papel do argumento ‘Saber ou não Saber’ em Teeteto 188a-c. Alguns intérpretes supõem que esse papel é dialético e Platão não está comprometido com sua verdade. Outros pensam que o argumento revela a confusão de Platão sobre o tema da opinião falsa à época do Teeteto. Em minha análise, há uma terceira via que faz mais justiça ao que Platão está desenvolvendo em 188a-c. Penso que em 188a-c temos uma versão do princípio platônico da infalibilidade.

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Plato'sDoxa

Moss¹

2020

Philosophical Books

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Plato is often regarded as a founding father of modern epistemology, the first to develop theories of knowledge and belief. Recent work has complicated this picture by showing that epistêmê, the superior kind in his epistemology, is strikingly different from contemporary epistemology's knowledge and perhaps has more in common with what we now call understanding. 1 What about the inferior kind in Plato's epistemology, however-doxa? As one can see from standard translations, explicit discussions, and tacit assumptions, it is widely held that here Plato really is talking about just what we talk about now: belief. The aim of this paper is to show that Plato's doxa is very different from belief. It is a special kind of phenomenon, something which has no clear counterpart in contemporary epistemology, but which Plato thought absolutely central both to epistemology and to ethics: cognition of what seems. 2 Three important notes before I begin. First, this is not a paper about the meaning of the word 'doxa' in Plato. I am not trying to capture every use of that word, nor am I confining my attention to contexts in which Plato uses that word. I aim to show that we can find in his writings a developed theory of a specific kind of cognition, something which he usually refers to as doxa-although he sometimes refers to it using other terms (such as 'pistis' at Gorgias 454d or Timaeus 29c), and although he occasionally uses 'doxa' to refer to other phenomena, including, arguably, belief (see section 9). Second, I will focus on Plato's account of doxa in the so-called middle dialogues, especially the Republic, Phaedo, and Timaeus, for it is here that I think the account most developed, although it has clear roots in the earlier dialogues, and survives in some form in the later. 3 Finally, although I want to show that Plato thinks of doxa very differently from how people nowadays think of belief, I will not try to show that doxa is not belief. I can imagine an interesting argument that the phenomenon I will describe is belief, conceived very differently from how we conceive it today. I do hope however to show that the differences are radical enough and fundamental enough that it is not fruitful to study Plato's doxa by beginning from the assumption that it is belief. We should not use our theories and intuitions about belief to guide or constrain our interpretations of doxa. If we do, we not only create problems for Plato's texts where there are none, we also miss out on features of his epistemology that are revealing, compelling, and very different from our own.

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On Today's Two‐Worlds Interpretation: Knowledge and True Belief in Plato

Cited by 3 publications

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Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue

Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue

Sobre o argumento “saber ou não-saber” em Teeteto 187d-200c

Plato'sDoxa

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