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This paper presents arguments against two crucial elements of recent versions of the Two‐Worlds interpretation of Plato. I argue first that in addition to knowledge of the forms, Plato allows beliefs about them as well. Then I argue that Plato sees knowledge as a state in which the subject is conscious of information about the forms. Thus, the infallibility of knowledge must be understood in a way that is consistent with its being informational. Finally, I argue that my conclusions about knowledge do not preclude the possibility that cognition of forms has a direct, nonrepresentational aspect.

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Plato and Aristotle agree that the best kind of thinking involves grasping and understanding entities different from sensible particulars. Second, they seem to agree that, for human beings, the perception of particulars is an indispensable step along the way to the understanding of the best objects. Third, they agree t h a t a n important part of the philosopher's job is to give a n account of the states and processes involved in the move from perception to understanding. One final point of agreement is t h a t the states of belief and experience ( e m p e i r i a ) stand in between perception and understanding. That is, Plato and Aristotle agree that belief and empeiria are closer than (mere) perception to understanding but still inferior to it.My primary goal in what follows is to give a n account of Aristotle's concept of e m p e i r i a t h a t illuminates the concept, isolates its connection with the notion of belief, and shows it to be worth our attention. I have started by mentioning points of agreement between Plato and Aristotle because, although Plato makes little of it, his understanding of e m p e i r i a includes elements crucial for a successful account of Aristotle's, or so I hope to show.