On the nature of pessimism in taking and giving games

Smith, Alexander

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2014.10.005

Cited by 13 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…This sensitivity is in line with experiments allowing for giving and taking simultaneously, meaning that subjects are sensitive to extending the choice set towards the possibility of taking endowment from the other player [4,5,34,45,46]. However, studies for which choice options remain isomorphic in GIVE and TAKE, as in this experiment, mostly find no difference between GIVE and TAKE [3,[6][7][8][9]13]. Regarding the hypothesized effects of larger allocation to the recipient in TAKE, this is not confirmed.…”

supporting

confidence: 64%

“…By varying the recipient from unknown individuals to a charity, Grossman & Eckel [7] show that in the case of a donation to a charity, the initial allocation of the endowment does not affect behavior. In a further experiment Smith [8] finds that the social framing of strategies affects participants' beliefs about the decisions of others. The allocation decisions, however, remain unaffected by the framing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It was conducted in April 2018 with 112 students from Bogor Agricultural University, Indonesia. 8 The questionnaire was divided into two parts: the first part aimed at eliciting values and the second set of questions aimed to induce in-group and out-group rationale.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To a certain degree, this provides explanation for the experimental results. Given that egoistic behavior towards an anonymous person 8 The questionnaire in English and Bahasa Indonesia can be found in the supplementary material. The survey link was distributed to students by university authorities and was accessible online.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Giving to versus Taking from In- and Out-Group Members

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Gallier

Schlüter

et al. 2018

Games

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In this experiment, we test whether subjects' responses to variations in the action set in a dictator game depends on induced group identities. The action set includes choices in which the dictator can either give money to or take money from the other player. As an extension to the anonymous setting, we introduce induced group identities using the minimal group paradigm. Based on a dictator game conducted with more than 300 students in Indonesia, we implement a full factorial design in order to analyze the framing of the action set in a varied cultural context and to examine varied prevalence of social norms given a group identity context. If group identity is not salient, we find that participants are slightly more generous when they have an opportunity to give to rather than to take from the recipient. However, when participants are matched with in-group members, this result is reversed and highly significant. The result of differing responses to framing effects in within-group interactions compared to a neutral setting are largely ascribed to the varied compliance with existing social norms.1 Closely related to [4], List [5] investigates give and take options in a dictator game. However, the results are not covered here, as the choice set is not isomorphically.

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confidence: 64%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Giving to versus Taking from In- and Out-Group Members

Alt

Gallier

Schlüter

et al. 2018

Games

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“…Some studies have found that including a take action in the dictator game caused dictators to behave more selfishly (Bardsely, 2008;Krupka & Weber, 2013;List, 2007), but these provided both give and take options simultaneously, making selfish choices appear comparatively less harmful (Parducci, 1965). When choice options have been kept consistent, simply framing the game as either giving or taking had no effect on distributions (Chowdhury et al, 2014;Dreber et al, 2013;Grossman & Eckel, 2015;Smith, 2015).…”

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confidence: 99%

Cruel to be kind but not cruel for cash: Harm aversion in the dictator game

2015

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People regularly take prosocial actions, making individual sacrifices for the greater good.Similarly, people generally avoid causing harm to others. These twin desires to do good and avoid harm often align, but can sometimes diverge, creating situations of moral conflict.Here, we examined this moral conflict using a modified dictator game. Participants chose how much money to allocate away from a recipient, who was designated as an orphan, creating a sense of harm. This money was then re-allocated to either the participant or a charity. People were strongly prosocial: they allocated more money away from the orphan for charity than for themselves. Furthermore, people left more money with the orphan when the harm was framed as a means (taking) than as a side effect (splitting). As predicted by dualprocess theories of moral decision making, response times were longer with the take action and positively correlated with the amount taken from the orphan. We conclude that just as people take positive actions for the greater good, they are similarly more willing to cause harm when it benefits others rather than themselves.

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Taking games: a meta-analysis

Flage

2024

J Econ Sci Assoc

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On the nature of pessimism in taking and giving games

Cited by 13 publications

References 45 publications

Giving to versus Taking from In- and Out-Group Members

Giving to versus Taking from In- and Out-Group Members

Cruel to be kind but not cruel for cash: Harm aversion in the dictator game

Taking games: a meta-analysis

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