“…Kraemer (1990 Kraemer ( /1991 and, following him,Laurence et al (1999) suggest a similar but broader claim: that it is possible to interpret the MTE thought experiment as suggesting that a higher-level functional property constitutes a common core of the theories true at both worlds. The scenario I sketch here is in fact only a special case of this broader claim: if the differences across worlds is explained by differences in psychologies this special case will pertain, but other differences across worlds would entail that the higher-level functional property has quite different realizers.…”
“…Kraemer (1990 Kraemer ( /1991 and, following him,Laurence et al (1999) suggest a similar but broader claim: that it is possible to interpret the MTE thought experiment as suggesting that a higher-level functional property constitutes a common core of the theories true at both worlds. The scenario I sketch here is in fact only a special case of this broader claim: if the differences across worlds is explained by differences in psychologies this special case will pertain, but other differences across worlds would entail that the higher-level functional property has quite different realizers.…”
“…Third, she can raise the issue of whether or not moral twin‐earth, as specified by Timmons, is metaphysically possible. Kraemer (, p. 468) raises this issue in what he brands a “metaphysical assault” on the metaphysical coherence of the idea of moral twin‐earth. Consider, for example, the following questions: i) are twin‐earthlings composed of the same chemical elements as earthlings?, ii) is the physiology of twin‐earthlings identical to that of earthlings?, iii) is the psychology of twin‐earthlings identical to that of earthlings in all non‐moral respects?…”
Section: Two Versions Of Timmons’ Argumentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Kraemer invites us to reflect upon what would happen to our common semantic intuitions if a rich set of advanced life forms were discovered on another planet having complex reproductive mechanisms mediated not by the chemical DNA, but by some very different chemical. Given the common and scientifically well‐established identification, here on earth, of a gene with a strand of DNA, would we be inclined to think that the newly discovered creatures lack genes since they lack DNA or would we be inclined to think that we had incorrectly identified genes with DNA strands (Kraemer, , p. 470)? Here is Kraemer's answer to the question:I am not sure what we would say.…”
Section: Two Versions Of Timmons’ Argumentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such indecision is instructive for it suggests that it may be difficult to predict accurately how our semantic intuitions will change given radical changes both in common epistemic corpus and in the common understanding of that corpus. (Kraemer, , p. 470)I take Kraemer's example to be one such that the intuitions arising from reflection on it are intuitions that arise from a case where matters are very fine‐grained. The linguistic intuitions of competent speakers are no longer a reliable guide to meaning given the fact that they concern a radically counterfactual scenario in which things are very different from what they are in the actual world.…”
Section: Two Versions Of Timmons’ Argumentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such indecision is instructive for it suggests that it may be difficult to predict accurately how our semantic intuitions will change given radical changes both in common epistemic corpus and in the common understanding of that corpus. (Kraemer, , p. 470)…”
Section: Two Versions Of Timmons’ Argumentmentioning
This article is concerned with Mark Timmons and Terence Horgan's influential twin-earth argument against the semantic views of that school of thought in metaethics that has come to be known as "Cornell realism". The semantic views of Cornell realism have been developed in greatest detail by Richard Boyd, and it is Boyd's view that is targeted by Timmons and Horgan. In the first part of the article, the twin-earth argument is introduced and two versions of it are disentangled. Thereafter, a defensive strategy is developed against the most powerful version of the argument. The conclusion of the article is that Timmons and Horgan's argument does not succeed in showing that the semantic views associated with Cornell realism are false.
A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of papers that make use of their ''Moral Twin Earth'' thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic intuitions. If they are right, the intuitions generated by Moral Twin Earth cannot be appealed to in arguments against externalist moral semantics. The most developed case against the Moral Twin Earth argument that follows this strategy is found in a paper by Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis and Angus Dawson. Here I argue that their attack on the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment fails. Laurence, Margolis and Dawson have not shown that we have reason to distrust the semantic intuitions it generates
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