Sound intuitions on Moral Twin Earth

Rubin, Michael H.

doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9118-8

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Sections 3 and 4 discuss other theories facing similar problems. 2 Horgan and Timmons (1993), Rubin (2008). 3 See also Merli (2002).…”

Section: Grim Arcmentioning

confidence: 99%

One-Person Moral Twin Earth Cases

Sinhababu

2019

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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This paper presents two cases demonstrating that theories allowing the environment to partially determine the content of moral concepts (such as the causal theory of reference) that provide incorrect truth‐conditions for moral terms. While typical Moral Twin Earth cases seek to establish that these theories fail to account for moral disagreement, neither case here essentially involves interpersonal disagreement. Both involve a single person retaining moral beliefs despite recognizing actual or potential mismatches with the purportedly content‐determining facts. This lets opponents of such theories grant objections that standard Moral Twin Earth cases fail to demonstrate disagreement, and argue more straightforwardly that they generate implausible truth‐conditions for moral claims.

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“…Sections 3 and 4 discuss other theories facing similar problems. 2 Horgan and Timmons (1993), Rubin (2008). 3 See also Merli (2002).…”

Section: Grim Arcmentioning

confidence: 99%

One-Person Moral Twin Earth Cases

Sinhababu

2019

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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“…Debunkers include Laurence, Margolis and Dawson (). But see Rubin () for a reply to Laurence et al . For a concise summary of the various modes of replying to the MTE argument, see Horgan and Timmons ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Exploring Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth: A Reply to Sonderholm

Horgan

Timmons

2015

Theoria

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In his 2013 Theoria article, "Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin-Earth Argument," Jorn Sonderholm attempts to undermine our moral twin earth (MTE) argument against Richard Boyd's moral semantics by debunking the semantic intuitions that are prompted by reflection on the thought experiment featured in the MTE argument. We divide our reply into three main sections. In section 1, we briefly review Boyd's moral semantics and our MTE argument against this view. In section 2, we set forth what we take to be Sonderholm's master debunking argument, along with his proposed Boydian explanation of the semantic intuitions he seeks to debunk. Then in section 3, we mount our defence of the semantic intuitions under scrutiny, arguing on abductive grounds that, contrary to Sonderholm, the semantic intuitions generated by reflection on MTE scenarios are to be trusted in evaluating the plausibility of Boydian moral semantics. Section 4 is our summary and conclusion.

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“…Rubin (, p. 314) offers an indirect argument in favour of Timmons’ twin‐earth argument. What Rubin aims to establish in that paper is exactly that Laurence, Margolis and Dawson fail to show that the respects in which the moral twin‐earth example differs from Putnam's twin‐earth example exert a distorting influence on our intuitions.…”

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confidence: 99%

Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin‐Earth Argument

Sønderholm

2012

Theoria

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This article is concerned with Mark Timmons and Terence Horgan's influential twin-earth argument against the semantic views of that school of thought in metaethics that has come to be known as "Cornell realism". The semantic views of Cornell realism have been developed in greatest detail by Richard Boyd, and it is Boyd's view that is targeted by Timmons and Horgan. In the first part of the article, the twin-earth argument is introduced and two versions of it are disentangled. Thereafter, a defensive strategy is developed against the most powerful version of the argument. The conclusion of the article is that Timmons and Horgan's argument does not succeed in showing that the semantic views associated with Cornell realism are false.

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Sound intuitions on Moral Twin Earth

Cited by 9 publications

References 26 publications

One-Person Moral Twin Earth Cases

One-Person Moral Twin Earth Cases

Exploring Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth: A Reply to Sonderholm

Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin‐Earth Argument

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