Moore on Twin Earth

Levy, Neil

doi:10.1007/s10670-010-9263-x

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Na tentativa de recusar P3, alguns defensores do RMN argumentam que a intuição não constitui evidência suficiente para se recusar o RMN. N. Levy (2011), A. Viggiano (2008 e J. Sonderholm (2012) apresentam as versões mais sofisticadas desse tipo de ataque 17 .…”

Section: Podemos Organizar O Atgm Do Seguinte Modounclassified

Uma defesa do Argumento da Terra gêmea Moral contra o Realismo Moral Naturalista

Kavetski

2023

Princípios

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

O Argumento da Terra Gêmea Moral (ATGM) é o desafio semântico central para o Realismo Moral Naturalista (RMN). À fim de evitar tal problema, os defensores do RMN têm articulado uma série de réplicas ao ATGM. Neste artigo, abordo algumas dessas réplicas e defendo a tese de que elas não refutam o ATGM. Considero duas propostas em específico: o Argumento da Tradução, de D. Copp, e o Argumento do Fim da Investigação Moral, de A. Viggiano. Apresento essas objeções, mostro em que sentido pretendem responder ao ATGM e argumento que cada uma delas é vulnerável a vários problemas. Concluo que os ataques de Copp e Viggiano ao ATGM devem ser recusados e que o desafio semântico ao RMN persiste.

show abstract

Section: Podemos Organizar O Atgm Do Seguinte Modounclassified

Uma defesa do Argumento da Terra gêmea Moral contra o Realismo Moral Naturalista

Kavetski

2023

Princípios

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Perhaps the most promising development of this strategy is offered by David Merli (2002: 225–31; see also Laurance et al. 1999; Levy’s 2011 for similar sentiments). Horgan and Timmons grant Boyd a robust causal regulation thesis, according to which the causal regulation of normative thought by certain natural properties is as robust as the sort of causal regulation that connects us to biological properties (say).…”

Section: Challenging Moral Twin Earthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Semantic Challenges to Normative Realism

McPherson

2013

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Normative realists might be assumed to have few worries about semantics. After all, a realist might initially hope to simply adopt the best semantic theory about ordinary descriptive language. However, beginning with the non-cognitivist appropriation of the open question argument, a number of philosophers have posed serious objections to the realist's ability to offer a plausible semantic theory. This paper introduces the two most influential semantic challenges to normative realism: the open question argument, and the Moral Twin Earth argument. It explains the major replies to these challenges offered by realists, and locates these challenges within the broader debate over what sort of semantic theories might be plausible candidates for a normative realist to adopt.

show abstract

“…Other proponents of NMR preserve the usual theory of contentfixing, and instead deny Premise 3. They argue that, despite initial appearances, the speakers do not express disagreement (e.g., Levy, 2011).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On Two Responses to Moral Twin Earth

Rubin

2013

Theoria

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons's Moral Twin Earth thought experiment poses a serious challenge for an influential kind of moral realism. It presents us with a case in which it is intuitive that two speakers are expressing a substantive disagreement with one another. However, the meta-semantics associated with this relevant form of moral realism entails that the speakers' moral predicates express different semantic contents, and thus, the moral sentences they utter do not express conflicting propositions. Consequently, this variety of moral realism implies, wrongly, that the speakers do not express substantive disagreement after all. Some philosophers have objected to the Moral Twin Earth argument on the grounds that is possible for two speakers to express disagreement with one another, even if the moral sentences they utter do not express conflicting propositions. Heimer Geirsson supports this claim by appeal to the distinction between semantic reference and speaker reference. David Merli supports the same claim by noting that speakers whose moral sentences do not express conflicting propositions may nevertheless express a non-moral, practical disagreement over what to do. In this article, I argue that neither Geirsson nor Merli provides moral realists with a satisfying response to the Moral Twin Earth argument.

show abstract

Moore on Twin Earth

Cited by 6 publications

References 10 publications

Uma defesa do Argumento da Terra gêmea Moral contra o Realismo Moral Naturalista

Uma defesa do Argumento da Terra gêmea Moral contra o Realismo Moral Naturalista

Semantic Challenges to Normative Realism

On Two Responses to Moral Twin Earth

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About