On the difficulty of promoting workers' safety behaviour: overcoming the underweighting of routine risks

Effects of Individual Risk Attitude, Safety Climate, and Affective Commitment on Safety Compliance

“…This bias reflects the human tendency to excessively under-weight delayed outcomes compared with the immediate ones, which has been documented in various experimental settings (see, e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, 2002). On the other hand, Zohar & Erev (2007) suggested that the very low probability of injury coupled with a learning process that over-weights recent outcomes under-weights small probability outcomes and thus the probability of getting injured.…”

“…On this aspect, Zohar & Erev (2007) pointed out how cognitive biases observed in decision making may interfere with the correct evaluation of the costs and benefits involved in the implementation of safety procedures. On one hand, the authors suggested that since the cost of implementation is certain and immediate, i.e., not wearing the helmet produces the immediate and certain elimination of the discomfort, and the benefit of the implementation is future and uncertain the consequences of not using the equipment can be underestimated because of the well-known melioration bias.…”

Development of a Safety Decision-Making Scenario to Measure Worker Safety in Agriculture

“…Neither approach provides a complete answer, but they both help to explain why workers routinely violate the longheld assumption of self-preservation in the workplace (Maslow, 1970). Zohar and Erev (2007) cited a flawed weighting of hazards by the employee and the delayed and uncertain occurrence of negative outcomes resulting from not following safety procedures as major contributors to irresponsible behavior. Worker attitudes may be conveyed as a failure to wear protective gear, to follow safety procedures, or to complete required training (Hofmann et al, 1995;Kouabenan, 2009;Reason et al, 1998).…”

“…Several interviewees reported taking unsafe risks to impress either supervisors or co-workers for the purpose of securing a promotion or gaining status within the organization or work group (Choudhry and Fang, 2008;Mullen, 2004). Zohar and Erev (2007) suggested that supervisors and management can either encourage or discourage these types of behaviors, but they must actively provide observation and feedback. Dekker (2002) took a different approach, focusing on behavior after the accident occurs.…”

“…Traditionally, a fundamental basis for risky decision-making has been the Expected Utility Theory (EUT), which posits that, when people make risky decisions, they weigh several options and the likelihood of each occurring (Newell et al, 2007;Zohar and Erev, 2007). The option with the highest "utility" to the decision-maker is selected as the final choice.…”