Risk perceptions of a series of biotechnology applications were examined in a public (nonexpert) sample and an expert sample. Compared with the experts, the public perceived all biotechnology applications as more risky. Both groups perceived food-related applications to be riskier than medical applications. Compared with the public, experts perceived both food and medical applications as less harmful and more useful. Experts also judged the risks posed from medical biotechnology applications as more familiar and acknowledged by people and science. Lay estimates of the risk of food applications were predicted by potential harm, potential benefits, science knowledge, and familiarity; experts' estimates were predicted only by harm and benefits. Lay estimates of the risk of medical applications were predicted by potential harm; experts' estimates were predicted by potential benefits, number and type of people exposed, and science knowledge. We discuss the implications of the results for risk communication about and management of different types of biotechnologies.

Risk perception is important in determining health-protective behavior. During the rise of the COVID-19 epidemic, we tested a comprehensive structural equation model of risk perception to explain adherence to protective behaviors in a crisis context using a survey of 572 Italian citizens. We identified two categories of protective behaviors, labeled promoting hygiene and cleaning, and avoiding social closeness. Social norms and risk perceptions were the more proximal antecedents of both categories. Cultural worldviews, affect, and experience of COVID-19 were the more distal predictors. Promoting hygiene and cleaning was triggered by the negative affective attitude toward coronavirus and mediated by an affective appraisal of risk. The deliberate dimension of risk perception (perceived likelihood) predicted only avoiding social closeness. Social norms predicted both types of behaviors and mediated the relations of cultural worldviews. Individualism (vs. communitarianism), more than hierarchy (vs. egalitarianism), shaped the affective evaluation of coronavirus. The model was an acceptable fit to the data and accounted for 20% and 29% of the variance in promoting hygiene and cleaning, and avoiding social closeness, respectively. The findings were robust to the effect of sociodemographic factors (age, gender, education, socioeconomic status, and zone of the country). Taken together, our findings confirmed the empirical distinction between affective and deliberate processes in risk perception, supported the validity of the affect heuristic, and highlighted the role of social norms as an account for why individualistic people were less likely to follow the prescribed health-protective behaviors. Implications for risk communication are discussed.

Among numerical formats available to express probability, ratios are extensively used in risk communication, perhaps because of the health professional's intuitive sense of their clarity and simplicity. Moreover, health professionals, in the attempt to make the data more meaningful, tend to prefer proportions with a numerator of 1 and shifting denominators (e.g., 1 in 200) rather than equivalent rates of disease per unit of population exposed to the threat (e.g., 5 in 1000). However, in a series of 7 experiments, it is shown that individual subjective assessments of the same probability presented through proportions rather than rates vary significantly. A 1-in-X format (e.g., 1 in 200) is subjectively perceived as bigger and more alarming than an N-in-X*N format (e.g., 5 in 1000). The 1-in-X effect generalizes to different populations, probabilities, and medical conditions. Further-more, the effect is not attenuated by a communicative intervention (verbal analogy), but it disappears with an icon array visual aid.

As a result of globalization, policymakers and citizens are increasingly communicating in foreign languages. This article investigates whether communicating in a foreign language influences lay judgments of risk and benefit regarding specific hazards such as "traveling by airplane," "climate change," and "biotechnology." Merging findings from bilingual and risk perception research, we hypothesized that stimuli described in a foreign language, as opposed to the native tongue, would prompt more positive overall affect and through that induce lower judgments of risk and higher judgments of benefit. Two studies support this foreign language hypothesis. Contrary to recent proposals that foreign language influences judgment by promoting deliberate processing, we show that it can also influence judgment through emotional processing. The present findings carry implications for international policy, such as United Nations decisions on environmental issues.

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels:trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

Three experiments examined three factors that may impede the discovery of hidden profiles: commitment to initial decision, reiteration effect, and ownership bias. Experiment 1 examined whether groups in which members are not asked to make an initial decision before group discussion are more likely to uncover hidden profiles than groups in which members are asked to make an initial decision. Experiment 2 examined this commitment to an initial decision and also the repetition of information for individuals. Experiment 3 explored the reiteration effect in groups and examined whether information that is usually repeated more in groups is viewed as more truthful. Experiments 1 and 2 found no support for the commitment to initial decision hypothesis for uncovering hidden profiles. Experiment 2 found that repetition of `common'information significantly reduced individuals' ability to uncover hidden profiles. Experiment 3 found that information individuals owned (both common and unique) before discussion was rated as more valid than other information. Experiment 3 did not find that common information, which is generally repeated more, was rated as more valid than unique information. Limitations of the current studies and suggestions for future research are discussed.

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Two experiments provided empirical support for the scarcity bias, that is, when the subjective value of a good increases due to the mere fact that it is scarce. We define scarcity as the presence of limited resources and competition on the demand side (i.e. not enough for two people). In Experiment 1, 180 students were divided into two conditions. The same good was abundant in one condition but scarce in the other one. The scarcity condition involved a partner (competitor) to create scarcity, while the abundant condition did not. Results showed that more participants chose a good when it was scarce than when it was abundant, for two out of four sets of items (ballpoints, snacks, pencils, and key rings). Experiment 2 employed 171 participants and a WTA (willingness to accept) elicitation procedure of the subjective value of the good. Results showed that the scarce good was given a higher WTA price by those participants choosing it, than by those who did not, compared to the WTA of the abundant good, despite the fact that both types of participants assigned a lower market price to the scarce good, as compared to the abundant one.Deux expériences ont confirmé empiriquement le biais de rareté (la valeur subjective d'un bien s'accroît en raison de sa seule rareté). La rareté est définie par une demande conflictuelle car confrontée à des ressources limitées (tout le monde ne pourra pas être satisfait). La première expérience fit appel à 180 étudiants répartis sur deux conditions. Le même bien était abondant dans l'une des conditions et rare dans l'autre. La condition de rareté impliquait la présence d'un concurrent pour créer la pénurie, concurrent inexistant dans la condition d'abondance. Les résultats ont montré que davantage de participants se sont portés sur un bien quand il était rare que lorsqu'il était abondant, cela pour deux des quatre séries d'items (stylos à bille, casse-croûte, crayons, porte-clefs). 171 sujets participèrent à la seconde expérience qui utilisa une procédure de mise en évidence de la valeur subjective du bien (WTA: prix jugé acceptable pour se procurer le bien). Il apparaît que le bien rare bénéficiait de la part de ceux qui le choisissait d'un prix WTA supérieur à celui octroyé par ceux qui le délaissaient, par comparaison au WTA du bien abondant, et cela en dépit du fait que les deux catégories de sujets accordaient un prix de vente inférieur au bien rare par rapport à celui qui était largement disponible.