Although dishonesty is often a social phenomenon, it is primarily studied in individual settings. However, people frequently collaborate and engage in mutual dishonest acts. We report the first meta-analysis on collaborative dishonesty, analyzing 87,771 decisions (21 behavioral tasks; k = 123; n participants = 10,923). We provide an overview of all tasks used to measure collaborative dishonesty, and inform theory by conducting moderation analyses. Results reveal that collaborative dishonesty is higher (a) when financial incentives are high, (b) in lab than field studies, (c) when third parties experience no negative consequences, (d) in the absence of experimental deception, and (e) when groups consist of more males and (f) younger individuals. Further, in repeated interactions, group members' behavior is correlated-participants lie more when their partners lie-and lying increases as the task progresses. These findings are in line with the justified ethicality theoretical perspective, suggesting prosocial concerns increase collaborative dishonesty, whereas honest-image concerns attenuate it. We discuss how findings inform theory, setting an agenda for future research on the collaborative roots of dishonesty. Public Significance StatementWe present the first meta-analysis on collaborative dishonesty-when groups can lie to increase the group's profits-covering 87,771 decisions made by 10,923 people engaging in 21 different experimental tasks. Results reveal various situational and personal factors shape collaborative dishonesty, including, for example, that group members affect each other's behavior over time. We propose that prosocial and honest-image concerns drive collaborative dishonesty.

The sharing economy is estimated to add hundreds of billions of dollars to the global economy and is rapidly growing. However, trust-based commercial sharing—the participation in for-profit peer-to-peer sharing-economy activity—has negative as well as positive consequences for both the interacting parties and uninvolved third parties. To share responsibly, one needs to be aware of the various consequences of sharing. We provide a comprehensive, preregistered, systematic literature review of the consequences of trust-based commercial sharing, identifying 93 empirical papers spanning regions, sectors, and scientific disciplines. Via in-depth coding of the empirical work, we provide an authoritative overview of the economic, social, and psychological consequences of trust-based commercial sharing for involved parties, including service providers, users, and third parties. Based on the aggregate insights, we identify the common denominators for the positive and negative consequences. Whereas a well-functioning infrastructure of payment, insurance, and communication enables the positive consequences, ambiguity about rules, roles, and regulations causes non-negligible negative consequences. To overcome these negative consequences and promote more responsible forms of sharing, we propose the transparency-based sharing framework. Based on the framework, we outline an agenda for future research and discuss emerging managerial implications that arise when trying to increase transparency without jeopardizing the potential of trust-based commercial sharing.

Corruption in the form of bribery continues to be a major societal challenge around the world. The current lab-in-the-field study tested whether dynamic descriptive norms messages on posters can help to reduce bribery. Before, during and after placing posters throughout a medium-sized South African town, incentivized measures of social norms and bribery were assessed in a mobile lab. A total of 311 participants stemming from the general population took part. In line with the pre-registered predictions, the results reveal that people: (1) perceive bribery to be less common; and (b) engage in bribery in a corruption game less frequently when the posters were displayed. The discussion outlines how social norms nudging campaigns can be leveraged to spur collective action against corruption.

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