The proposed experiment will examine the effect of deceptive behavior on memory.Participants will be assigned to a "strong-incentive to cheat" or "weak-incentive to cheat" condition and play the adapted Sequential Dyadic Die-Rolling paradigm. Specifically, Player A (computer; participants think it is another participant) throws a die and reports it to Player B (participant). Then Player B throws his/her die, remembers the outcome, and reports it to Player A. Participants in the "strong-incentive to cheat" condition are monetarily punished if their die roll outcome differs from Player A's die roll outcome. Participants in the "weak-incentive to cheat" condition are not punished if the die roll outcomes differ. Two-days later, memory for the die-rolling event will be assessed. We predict that participants in the "strong-incentive to cheat" condition will have lower belief and recollection for the die-rolling event and will report more errors than participants in the "weak-incentive to cheat" condition.